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S INCE the end of the two great wars the world has been expe-riencing enormous fluctuations of foreign exchanges. Their 
, unprecedented scale and rapidity range prominently among the 
novel causes endangering the regular flow of international trade. 
The court decisions abound with frightening examples of mal-
adjustments resulting therefrom. Whether it is the obligation or 
its discharge that are to be measured in a currency foreign to one 
of the parties the appreciation or depreciation of the foreign ex-
change in terms of another money may substantially increase, 
reduce or even wipe out the equivalent received by the creditor or 
expended by the debtor in their respective domestic money.1 As 
foreign exchange is almost inevitably involved in all international 
transactions, the importance of the problem is self-evident. 
Usually, the parties are willing to assume such risks up to the 
maturity of the obligation. Frequently they may protect them-
selves by buying or selling the foreign exchange forward at a price 
fixed in their own national currency.2 However, such protection 
• Member, New York Bar and Faculty of New York University School of Law.-Ed. 
1 In Transamerica General Corp. v. Zunino, 82 N.Y.S. (2d) 595 (1948), the court held 
that an obligation of 2,526,791 lire worth $207,196 at the time of the commencement of 
action was discharged by payment in depreciated lire worth only $6,500 at the subsequent 
time of payment. In De Sayve v. De La Valdene, 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 143 (1953), affd. with• 
out opinion, 283 App. Div. 918, 130 N.Y.S. (2d) 865 (1954), the same judge decided that 
an obligation of $58,000 and£ (U.K.) 5,000 payable in France, worth at maturity (inclusive 
of interest) 3,200,000 French francs was to be measured at the pre-depreciation value of 
the francs of $123,000, presently worth 41,000,000 francs. A valuation at the present (de• 
preciated) rate of exchange of the franc would have given plaintiff only about $9,000, the 
present equivalent of 3,200,000 francs. Other examples are discussed throughout this 
paper. 
2 CRUMP, THE ABC OF FOREIGN EXCHANGES, 11th ed., 71, 84, 94 (1951). But see art. v, 
§3, subdiv. · (b) of International Monetary Fund Agreement [United Nations Monetary 
and Financial Conference, Final Act and Related Documents, Conference Series 55, Pub-
lication 2187, U.S. Dept. of State (1944)] providing that "(b) a member shall not be en-
titled without the permission of the Fund to use the Fund's resources to acquire currency 
to hold against forward exchange transactions." For these and other reasons such "cover" 
may be frequently unavailable. 
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becomes unavailing in the event of a default in payment. Here 
the date of the future discharge is unknown. Yet it is the un-
predictable rate of exchange prevailing on such future date that 
may affect the economic benefits or burdens of the outcome. As 
of what date then should the fluctuating value of a foreign money 
obligation be measured in such instances? 
Another element of uncertainty arises from the fact that these 
fluctuations are erratic, rather than orderly and proportionate. 
The depreciation of the rate of exchange need not be a corollary 
of a decline in the domestic purchasing power of money.3 At 
times it may be difficult to. ascertain whether there was any real 
depreciation of the foreign currency, or whether the fluctuation 
of the rate of exchange was due to the appreciation of another 
money in which the value of the former is measured, or to other 
causes. Fluctuations of the external value of money may result 
from governmental manipulations of the rate of exchange. Such 
interference may be motivated by the expectation that the reduc-
tion of the (external) value of the domestic money in terms of 
another currency will not result in a proportionate increase of the 
(export) prices in terms of domestic money. Devaluations are 
frequently resorted to in order to improve the devaluating coun-
try's competitive ability in foreign markets, its domestic employ-
ment situation and balance of payments.4 Consequently, measured 
in terms of its purchasing power, rather than another currency, 
there may be no loss at all, or if any, its extent may not be commen-
surate with the devaluation.5 
3 See criticism of the purchasing power parity theory and the analysis of the external 
value of inconvertible paper money in KURIHARA, MONETARY THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
313 ff. (1950); CRUMP, note 2 supra; at 136-143; CHANDLER, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY AND 
BANKING, rev. ed., 665 ff. (1953). See also Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 
(2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 952, n. 25, referring to the brief of the United States, showing 
the discrepancy between the post-devaluation rate of exchange of the pound in terms of 
dollars and the purchasing power of the two currencies. Transamerica General Corp. 
v. Zunino, 82 N.Y.S. (2d) 595 (1948), in which it was pointed out (at 605) that the loss 
of an Italian creditor from depreciation of its national currency payable in Italy, even if 
recoverable under Italian law, should not be measured "by the arbitrary rule of the re-
lation of that currency to the value of the currency of some other country, but by the 
more rational rule of relating the currency in which the debt was expressed to the in-
trinsic value of its metal content, its legal value as legal tender, or its value as purchasing 
power in the country in which the debt and currency exist." See also note 5 infra. 
4 International Monetary Fund Annual Report of April 30, 1950, p. 5; International 
Monetary Fund Agreement, cited in note 2 supra, art. IV, §5. 
5 A comparison of the effect of the wave of devaluations that took place in the Fall 
of 1949 on the price structure of the respective countries published in the International 
Monetary Fund Annual Report of 1950, pp. 1-14 is illustrative. It points out that eighteen 
member-countries of the Fund and some nonmembers devalued their currencies mostly 
by about 30.5% in relation to the American dollar. These devaluations were based on 
the assumption that the export prices measured in the domestic money of the devaluating 
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A devaluation may cause different reactions in other countries. 
If countries A and B devaluate their respective national currencies 
in the same proportion there may be no substantial change in the 
value of one in terms of the other. However, ceteris paribus, there 
will be a substantial depreciation of the currencies of A and B if 
measured in the currency of C, a country which did not devaluate 
its currency.6 Thus, if measured in the currency of B, the cur-
rency of A appears to have remained stable; if measured in the 
currency of C, it appears to have depreciated. 
Hence, the determination of the currencies in which the 
original obligation is to be measured (money of contract, money 
of account), or the damages resulting from a default in payment 
are to be computed (money of damages), or the primary (original) 
or secondary obligation (damages) may or must be discharged 
(money of payment), or in which the award is to be expressed 
(money of judgment) become of utmost importance. In fact a 
proper choice of the applicable currency will decide whether any 
fluctuation may be taken into consideration at all, and if so, to 
what extent.7 
The creditor may seek a valuation in a firmer currency. The 
debtor will prefer the softer money. If unsuccessful, the former 
may argue for the application of the pre-depreciation maturity-day 
rate of exchange, while the latter will favor a judgment-day valua-
tion, which would reduce his obligation. 
. Sometimes the monies ·in which the obligation is to be meas-
ured or payment is to be made or even their respective rates of 
exchange may have been fixed by an express or implied term of the 
contract. This may be controlling up to maturity. But usually 
there is little indication as to the currency in which, or as to the 
time as of which, the loss from belated payment is to be measured 
where there was a default. 
country would not rise in pr~portion to the extent of the devaluation. These expecta• 
tions proved to be correct. According to the Report (p. 11), by April of 1950 the export 
prices increased in the respective domestic currencies in the United Kingdom by little 
more than 4%, in Norway only slightly more, and in the Netherlands by about 8%, 
while, measured in U.S. dollars, imports from the United Kingdom showed an average 
reduction of 20 to 25% in landed cost. 
6 For the purposes of this analysis it may suffice to compare the so-called par values 
(or the official rates of exchange) in the summary published in the International Monetary 
Fund Annual Report of 1950 at pp. 88, 89. Note, e.g., the change in the rate of exchange 
between the pound sterling and the U.S. dollar; Pre-devaluation rate £, I to $4.03; post-
devaluation rate £, I to $2.80. 
7 See Part III-D, infra and particularly Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), 
cited and examined therein; and note 3 supra. 
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Additional difficulties will arise where the primary (original), 
or the secondary obligation (damages), are expressed in a money 
foreign to the forum, if an action is instituted in this country. In 
our courts judgments are to be expressed in dollars and cents.8 
Consequently, foreign money obligations must be converted into 
our national currency (money of judgment) in order to permit the 
court to render an award. The foreign litigant's domestic money 
equivalent will again vary in accordance with the selection of the 
valuation date.9 Yet, the jurisdiction in this country may have 
been obtained by chance.10 A valuation in dollars may not have 
been contemplated by the parties.11 A breach-day valuation in 
the money of the United States, one of the firmest and most c;lesir-
able currencies of the world, may improve the position of the 
creditor far beyond what he may have been entitled to under his 
contract.12 In turn, potential foreign investors may be deterred 
from permitting their assets to reach a jurisdiction subjecting them 
to such risks in the event' of an attachment. 
The emergence of these difficult problems caught the courts 
unprepared. During the long period of the pre-world war stability 
· these questions were of relatively little importance. Under what 
was considered the automatic mechanism of the classical gold stand-
s Coinage Act of April 2, 1792, c. 16, §20, 1 Stat. L. 250, 31 U.S.C. (1952) §371; 29 
N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1948) §27; Frontera Transportation Co. v. Abaunza, (5th 
Cir. 1921) 271 F. 199; Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, (2d Cir. 1951) 189 
F. (2d) 952 at 954; Eder, "Legal Theories of Money," 20 CoRN. L. Q. 52 at 63 (1934). With 
respect to England, see Manners v. Pearson & Son, [1898] 1 Ch. D. 581 at 587; Di 
Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409 at 413; Celia v. Volturno, [1921] 
2 A.C. 544 at 588; DICEY, CoNFLicr OF LA.ws, 6th ed., Rule 165, p. 744 (1949). With 
respect to Canada see 1 Rev. Stat., c. 40, §15 (1) (1927). However, in many co11ntries 
judgments may be expressed in foreign money, see SCHNITZER, HANDBUCH DE.S INTERNA· 
TIONALEN PR!vATRECHTS, 3d ed., c. XII (1950); R.AAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRIVA'JRECHT, 
3d ed., 334 (1950); MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY, 2d ed., 307-309 (1953). 
9 Compare Sirie v. Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N.Y.S. 52 (1921) (sum of francs 
owing to a French creditor measured in dollars at the post-depreciation judgment-day 
rate of exchange gave plaintiff the dollar equivalent of the identical amount of francs 
actually owed as of the time of judgment) with Comptoir Commercial D'Importation v. 
Zabriskie, 127 Misc. 461, 216 N.Y.S. 473 (1926) (sum of francs owing to a French plain-
tiff measured in dollars at the pre-depreciation breach-day rate of exchange gave plaintiff 
a greater amount of francs than the numerical sum actually owed), and with Page v. 
Levenson, 281 F. 555 (1922) [sum of francs measured in dollars at the maturity (breach)-
day rate of exchange gave plaintiff a lesser amount of francs than the numerical sum orig-
inally owing to him, where the franc appreciated in terms of dollars after maturity]. 
10 De Sayve v. De La Valdene, 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 143; and the cases cited in note 11 
jnfra. 
11 Parker v. Hoppe, 257 N.Y. 333, 178 N.E. 550 (1931), analyzed in note 48 infra; 
Taubenfeld v. Taubenfeld, 198 Misc. 108, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 158 (1950); Perutz v. Bohemian 
Discount Bank, 279 App. Div. 386, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 446 (1952), revd. on other grounds, 
304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E. (2d) 6 (1953); Sulyok v. Penzintezeti Kozpont Budapest, 279 App. 
Div. 528, 111 N.Y.S. (2d) 75 (1952), affd. as mod. 304 N.Y. 704, 107 N.E. (2d) 604 (1952). 
12 But see Page v. Levenson, 281 F. 555 (1922), mentioned in note 9 supra. 
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ard fluctuations of rates of exchange were limited to the narrow 
margins between the gold points.13 As long as currencies were 
linked to gold by a firm ratio it mattered little whether the obliga-
tion was measured or discharged in one currency or another. Under 
the changed conditions of our times this matter became of primary, 
and as it appears, permanent importance. In this era, monetary 
stability in most countries appears to have been subordinated to 
other economic aims. It is not so much the law as the objectives 
of monetary policy and possibly the nature, quality and concepts 
of money which have radically changed.14 Thus the Scylla and 
Charybdis confronting the courts rest in two factors: lack of prec-
edent and unsuitability of some of the scanty principles developed 
in the past with respect to a substantially different money. 
In their search for a solution, at first, the courts were tempted 
tp develop simple mechanical rules by which foreign money would 
be valued at a fixed date: when the obligation accrued (maturity, 
or breach day);15 or under certain circumstances when judgment 
was rendered.16 In numerous instances the outcome proved to be 
contrary to the principle that damages are to be compensatory. At 
times it reduced the obligation of the party at fault. At others it 
improved the creditor's position far beyond what he would have 
obtained if there had been no default.17 These ill effects led to 
their rejection by what this ·writer considers the weight of decisions 
of our courts.18 Yet a number of recent cases still cling to the dis-
credited mechanical doctrines.19 Most unfortunately some of the 
decisions contradict each other as to which of the different mechan-
ical rules should be applied, 20 suggesting sometimes that different 
rules have been adopted by federal and New York State courts.21 
13 FOSI'ER, RODGERS, BOGEN AND NADLER, MONEY AND BANKING, 4th ed., 409-416, 423-
426 (1953). 
14 CR.UMP, note 2 supra, at 148, 149 points out that prior to 1914 devaluation of a 
currency "was regarded as a breach of faith both to the holders of the currency in ques-
tion and also to other countries," but that the "war of 1914-18 rendered this attitude 
untenable." See also notes 3 and 5 supra. 
15 Part Il-B and D infra. 
16 Part Il-C infra. 
17 Notes 15 and 16 supra. 
18 Part Ill-A infra. 
19 De Sayve v. De La Valdene, 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 143 at 151 (1953) [but see critique in 
notes 49, 208 and 258 infra]; Taubenfeld v. Taubenfeld, 198 Misc. 108, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 
158 (1950); Bonell v. Von Schultz, 197 Misc. 756, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 617 (1950). 
20 Compare the cases cited in note 19 supra. 
21De Sayve v. De La Valdene, 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 143 (1953); CoNFLicrs REsrATEMENT, 
New York Annotations §424 (1935); MANN, note 8 supra, at 309, and numerous other 
writers. But see Parts Ill and IV infra. 
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What then should a creditor of a foreign money obligation col-
lect where there was a delay in payment? When are damages for 
depreciation of foreign money recoverable? As of what time and 
in what currency are they to be computed? How is the value of 
a foreign money obligation to be measured where no damages 
may be had? The answers to these and other inciaental questions 
require a thorough analysis of certain features peculiar to the law 
of money. 
It is the purpose of this article to clarify these problems, to 
sum up the primary principles by which they are governed and 
to show why the rational rule, emphasizing reparation of the loss 
due to depreciation of foreign money after maturity, rather than 
mere mechanical doctrines, is bound to prevail.22 
IL THE MECHANICAL RULES 
A. The Ambulatory Concept of Money 
A few general remarks on certain legal characteristics of mone-
tary obligations made at the outset, and an outline of what this 
writer refers to as the mechanical valuation rules, will facilitate 
the understanding of the special problem examined in this paper. 
22 The importance of this problem was recognized in numerous writings. and court 
decisions. Many of the conclusions expressed therein are of great value. It is submitted, 
however, that none of them contains a complete systematic presentation of the under-
lying principles. It is for this reason that they did not succeed in deducing what this 
writer considers the rational n!le. 
Among the numerous writings on this subject are NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAw 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 361-374 (1950); MANN, note 8 supra, at 245-255, and cc. IX 
and X; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1410A (1937); CHITTY, CONTRACTS 435-437 
(1947); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1005 (1951); McCORMICK, DAMAGES 190-204 (1935); DICEY, 
CONFLICT OF LAws, 6th ed., Rules 160-163 (1949); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§423.1, 
424.l (1935); CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT §§423, 424 (1934); 15 AM. JUR., Dam-
ages §§60, 63 (1938); Gluck, "The Rate of Exchange in the Law of Damages," 22 CoL. 
L. REv. 217 (1922); Rifkind, "Money as a Device for Measuring Value," 26 CoL. L. REV. 
559 (1926); Drake, "The Proper Rule in Fluctuating Exchanges," 28 MICH. L. REv. 229 
(1930); Fraenkel, "Foreign Moneys in Domestic Courts," 35 COL. L. REv. 360 (1935); 
Graveson, "The Discharge of Foreign Monetary Obligations in English, Courts," UNIV. OF 
MICH. LECTURES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (1951); notes: 
40 HARV. L. REv. 619 (1927); 36 VA. L. REv. 215 (1950); 15 Mon. L. REv. 369 (1952); 
68 L. Q. REv. 163 (1952); 61 YALE L. J. 758 (1952); 52 COL. L. REV. 141 (1952); 36 MINN. 
L. REv. 968 (1952), and others cited in the above writings. Among the older writings 
of a different era, see STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, 7th ed., 425-
444 (1883), and SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, 9th ed., §§273-275, pp. 538, 542 (1912). 
The problem of selecting the proper kind of rates of exchange, such as a single 
official rate, one of the multiple official or free market rates (see cases and materials cited 
in notes 125, 127, 205, 206 infra) requires a separate analysis and exceeds the scope of this 
paper. 
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Although the economic and legal concepts of money are dif-
ferent,23 some of the economic functions of money are important 
criteria for its legal classification. 
In an international market merchandise (commodities) may 
be bought, sold, or paid for either in domestic or foreign curren-
cies. The commodity is the object of the transaction. The respec-
tive currencies, such as dollars, sterling, francs, etc., serve as the 
measure of its value or as a generally accepted medium of payment. 
Performing these important functions of "money" (measure of 
value and general medium of payment)24 they were treated by the 
parties and are to be classified for this purpose as "money."25 
On the other hand, in our domestic market foreign money it-
self may be bought and sold for dollars or even another currency. 
Here the foreign money becomes the object of the transaction. 
For certain limited purposes of the transaction it was treated by 
the parties, and may have to be classified in law, as a commodity.26 
In turn, the dollars or another currency in which its (foreign 
money acquired as a commodity) value was measured or payment 
was made may have been contemplated to function in this trans-
action, and therefore may have to be classified as "money." This 
does not prevent the recipient of the foreign money, previously 
treated as a commodity for the limited purposes of the transaction, 
23 E.g., Bank demand deposits, checking accounts or checks are frequently considered 
money by economists. See KENT, MONEY AND BANKING, rev. ed., 5 (1951); CRUMP, note 2 
supra, at 26. See also HALM, MONETARY THEORY, 2d ed., 28ff. (1946). In law, such deposits, 
accounts or checks are choses in action distinguishable from money in many respects. 
Thomson v. Bank of British North America, 82 N.Y. 1 (1880); Rhodes &: Co. v. Weis-
glass &: Co., 178 N.Y.S. 378 (1919); Palmer v. Golden, 127 Misc. 487, 216 N.Y.S. 509 (1926), 
affd. 221 App. Div. 360, 223 N.Y.S. 897 (1927). See also NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, at 
108-113; MANN, note 8 supra, at 24. 
24 FOSTER, RODGERS, BOGEN AND NADLER, note 13 supra, at 10-11; KENT, note 23 supra, 
at 5; CHANDLER, note 3 supra, at 6-11. 
25 Parker v. Hoppe, 258 N.Y. 365 at 367, 179 N.E. 770 (1932) (denial of motion for 
reargument), note 48 infra; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 at 255, 59 S.Ct. 
847 (1939); 20 YALE L. J. 604 at 606, 609, 617 (1911); MANN, supra note 8, at 142-144, 
149-154; NUSSBAUM, supra note 22, at 22-24, 318-321. The problem of classification of cur-
rencies as "money" or "commodity" is examined throughout this article (esp. Parts II-B 
to D and III-B). Considerable confusion was caused by the erroneous view of some older 
authorities indiscriminately holding that foreign money was always a mere commodity. 
See, e.g., Petkus v. Lietuvos Ukio Bankas, 123 Misc. 193, 204 N.Y.S. 726 at 729 (1924); 
Marrache v. Ashton, [1943] A.C. 311; CONFLICTS REsTATEMENT §423 (1934); TORTS RE-
STATEMENT, c. 47, comment to §911 (1939). It may be interesting to note that in Bronson 
v. Rodes, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.).229 at 250-251 (1868), and in other cases, even specific kinds of 
domestic money (gold coins) were classified as a mere commodity. However, this view 
was expressly rejected in Norman v. Baltimore &: Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 at 301-302, 
55 S.Ct. 407 (1935). 
:26 Brown v. Perera, 182 App. Div. 922, 176 N.Y.S. 215 (1918); Richard v. American 
Union Bank (2d case), 253 N.Y. 166 at 175, 170 N.E. 532 (1930). See also note 27 and 
Part III-B infra. 
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to use the same as money (measure of value or medium of pay-
ment) in another transaction, or vice versa.27 This shows that the 
classification as "money" or "commodity" depends on the facts 
of the case and, as will be illustrated later,28 on the purposes of 
the classification. 
Similar ambulatory features are encountered in connection 
with the classification of money as domestic or foreign. The dollar, 
franc or mark may be foreign or domestic to one or either party, 
to the controlling law, place of payment, forum, domicile, place of 
business of the parties or the purpose for which it was intended to 
be used. Consequently, in accordance with the contemplation 
of the parties Czechoslovak money payable in Germany under a 
Czechoslovak contract was classified as foreign for determining 
whether damages for its depreciation after a default in payment 
were recoverable.29 Again in accordance with a different intention 
of the parties Czechoslovak money owing under a wholly Czecho-
slovak contract between two Czechoslovak nationals, looking upon 
Czechoslovak crowns as their domestic currency, appears to have 
been properly classified by a New York court as domestic with 
respect to the question of damages. For a different purpose, 
namely with regard to the procedural requirement that judgments 
are to be expressed in our national currency, the same decision 
treated the Czechoslovak money as foreign.30 In this respect the 
intention of the parties was irrelevant. The reasons for such 
classifications are more complicated and are discussed further 
below. 
These few examples illustrate that the characterization of 
money, as foreign or domestic will again change in accordance with 
the purposes of the classification. The relativity of these con-
cepts creates substantial difficulties for, in law, as explained further 
27 Compare Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), 241 N.Y. 163, 168, 149 N.E. 
338 (1925) with Richard v. American Union Bank (2d case), note 26 supra. See also 
Brown v. Perera, note 26 supra, showing that even where for certain limited purposes 
money may have to be treated as a "commodity" it may still have to be classified as 
"money" for other objectives. · 
28 Part Ill-B infra. 
29 Highest Court of Czechoslovakia, Official Report (Vazny) 15865, Rv. I 266/35 (1937). 
so Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 279 App. Div. 386, 110 N.Y.S. J2d) 446 (1952), 
revd. on other grounds 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E. (2d) 6 (1953); Deutsche Bank Filiale Num• 
berg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 47 S.Ct. 166 (1926), was based on similar views, but see 
also Part IV-D infra distinguishing between the domestic and foreign money valuation 
rules. 
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below, money and commodity, and domestic and foreign money 
are governed by different principles.31 
Quite generally it may be stated that under our law losses 
from fluctuations ot changes in value of goods are usually re-
coverable in actions for breach of contract, while no damages for 
depreciation of our domestic money are permissible.32 With 
respect to foreign money, this analysis will attempt to show that 
the recovery of such damages is limited to certain special situa-
tions. 33 
The frequent disregard of this problem of classification and of 
its effect contributed to the unsatisfactory results obtained by the 
courts. 
B. The Single Rule Doctrine 
The early post World War I decisions began by trying to solve 
the question of valuation of foreign money after maturity by 
applying some of the rules on breach of contract to deliver goods 
(commodities).34 This commodity concept of foreign money led 
to the adoption of the so-called breach or maturity-day rule.36 In 
accordance with the rule that damages for non-delivery of goods 
are to be measured as of the time and place stipulated in the con-
tract, the valuation was said to be required at the rate of exchange 
of the foreign money prevailing at the time of maturity of the 
s1 Part III-B and H infra. 
32 Part IV-B infra. 
33 Part ID infra. 
34 Petkus v. Lietuvos Ukio Bankas, 123 Misc. 193, 204 N.Y.S. 726 at 729 (1924); cases 
cited in note 35; Gluck, "The Rate of Exchange in the Law of Damages," in 22 CoL. L. 
R.Ev. 217 at 249-250 (1922); Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409 at 
413 (per Bankes, L. J.) citing Vaugbam Williams, L. J., as saying in Manners v. Pearson, 
[1898] 1 Cb. 581 at 592 that the "mode of computing the value of foreign currency in 
English Sterling, and thus converting the one currency into the other, is based upon 
damages for breach of contract to deliver the commodity bargained for at the appointed 
time and place. ••• " To the same effect see Celia v. Voltumo, [1921] 2 A.C. 544 at 551, 
per Lord Buckmaster, but see id. at p. 568, dissenting opinion of Lord Carson, pointing 
out that Vaugbam Williams, L. J., "was a dissenting judge, and bis judgment cannot 
be reconciled with the judgments delivered by the majority of the Court, Lindley, M. R. 
and Rigby, L. J."; and Drake in 28 MICH. L. R.Ev. 229 at 233 (1930), saying that Manners 
v. Pearson "is apparently not in line with the decision in Scott v. Bevan," 2 B. and Ad. 78, 
109 Eng. Rep. 1073 (1831), also relied upon in the Di Ferdinando case and "is not in 
accordance with the 'breach day' rule." With respect to the two different breach-day rules 
see Part Il-D infra. 
36 See authorities cited in note 34 supra; Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37, 
138 N.E. 497 (1923); Sokoloff v. National City Banlc, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928); 
Kantor v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 222 App. Div. 502, 226 N.Y.S. 582, affd. 248 N.Y. 630, 
162 N.E. 553 (1928). See also Il-D infra. 
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obligation, breach of contract, or commission of the wrong.36 
All moneys foreign to the forum were treated as "foreign."37 
As it usually was the foreign money which had depreciated in 
terms of the money of the forum the result frequently favored the 
injured party.38 Faith in the stability of their own national cur-
rency inherited from a happier past seems to have induced the 
courts to believe that the rule would always do justice.39 Moreover, 
the fixing of the quantum of the obligation as of a single date was 
expected to discourage speculation.40 
The subsequent devaluations and depreciation of the dollar 
and sterling illustrate the fallacy of these assumptions.41 Where it 
was the money of the forum which had depreciated the maturity-
day valuation, instead of giving compensation, worked to the bene-
fit of the party at fault. As pointed out before, it reduced the obliga-
36 See cases cited in notes 34 and 35 supra. However, such generalizations as may 
be implied from the literal meaning of the name by which the rule became known are 
not quite accurate. It should be noted that in Celia v. Volturno, [1921] 2 A.C. 544, one 
of the leading breach-day cases, the loss of earnings in Italian money was measured as 
of the respective times of loss of hire during two subsequent periods of time, while 
the ship damaged in a collision had been repaired, rather than as of the time of the pre-
ceding collision (tort). In another case, Cummings v. London Bullion Co., [1952] 1 All 
E.R. 383 at 388, Denning, L. J., pointed out that "the critical date is not so much the 
date when the cause of action arose, but rather the date when the debt should have 
been paid." After having considered the effect of §33 (I) of the English Exchange Con-
trol Act, 1947, he stated that the debt was not payable until the debtor was given a 
Treasury permission to do so. To the same effect, see id., p. 389, per Romer, L. J. See 
also Comptoir Commercial D'Importation v. Zabriskie, 127 Misc. 461, 216 N.Y.S. 473 at 
477 (1926) (valuation as of the diverse times when the respective items of the loss caused 
by the breach had been incurred). 
37 Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928) (Russian roubles 
owing to a Russian); the Di Ferdinando case and Celia v. Volturno, both cited in note 
34 supra (Italian lire owing to Italian plaintiffs); the Zabriskie case, cited in note 36; 
and Page v. Levenson, (D.C. Md. 1922) 281 F. 555 (French francs owing to French plain-
tiffs). It is doubtful whether Parker v. Hoppe, 258 N.Y. 365, 179 N.E. 770 (1932), in 
which roubles owing to a Russian creditor were valued at the breach-day rate of ex-
change, although frequently cited among leading breach-day cases, belongs in this group 
(see note 48 infra). It should be noted that the subsequent two-rule doctrine dis-
tinguishes between two categories of foreign money. See II-D infra. With respect to the 
problem of classification in general, see II-A supra and Part III-B infra. 
38 See cases cited in notes 34 and 35 supra. 
39 Except for the first World War period the United Kingdom was on the gold stand-
ard until 1931. This and the international position of the sterling made it one of the 
most desirable currencies up to that time. The fixing of the value of foreign money 
in terms of sterling as of breach day may have been believed to protect the creditor 
from further fluctuations of the real value of the obligation. The subsequent deprecia-
tion and devaluation of the pound and the modern mol!etary theories that have pre-
vailed in numerous countries show that this view was erroneous. See Part I; and DAY, 
THE FUTURE OF STERLING (1954). 
40 Celia v. Volturno, [1921] 2 A.C. 544 at 558, per Lord Sumner; on this subject see 
also MANN, supra note 8, at 329. 
41 See note 39 supra. 
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tion.42 The debtor may have profitably speculated in the money 
of a foreign forum. . 
The unreliability of the rule in the opposite direction made it-
self noticeable where the obligation expressed in the creditor's own 
national currency had depreciated in terms of the money of the 
forum. Thus an award of pounds sterling computed by an English 
court at the pre-depreciation breach-day rate of exchange of lire 
gave an Italian plaintiff at the time of judgment the equivalent of 
96,000 lire, where his loss was only 48,000 lire.43 The domestic 
purchasing power of his national currency or its rate of exchange 
in terms of other foreign exchanges may not have been reduced, 
or at least not in the same proportion. The depreciation of his 
national currency in terms of the wholly unrelated money of a 
foreign forum may not have caused him any damage at all.44 Had 
timely payment been made the lire may have depreciated even in 
his possession. These facts and the question of whether such dam-
ages had been within the contemplation of the parties were not 
even taken into consideration by the court, for the rule, whose 
application may have resulted in a windfall to the creditor, was 
purely mechanical.45 
It will be noted that under the iron laws of arithmetic the 
breach-day valuation will always work to the benefit of one of the 
parties irrespective of the merits of the case. Where it is the cur-
rency whose value is being measured (mensuratum)-in our ex-
ample the lira-which depreciates in terms of the currency in 
which it is being measured (mensura)-in our example, sterling-
the result ,rill favor the creditor. Where the latter money depre-
ciates in terms of the former, the outcome will favor the debtor. 
Consequently, whether the injured party is placed in an equal, a 
better, or a worse position becomes a matter of chance. 
Nevertheless, at least as the law stands now, the breach or ma-
turity-day rule has found general acceptance in the English 
courts.46 For a time it appeared that it would also prevail in this 
42 Barry v. Van den Hurk, [1920] 2 K.B. 709; Lebeaupin v. Crispin, [1920] 2 K.B. 715; 
Page v. Levenson, (D.C. Md. 1922) 281 F. 555; Khoury v. Khayat, [1943] A.C. 507; Sulka 
v. Brandt, 154 Misc. 534, 277 N.Y.S. 421 at 422 (1935). 
43 Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits &: Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409. A similar result was 
obtained in the Zabriskie case cited in note 36 supra. Here the plaintiff was a French 
corporation suing in New York for compensation of a loss sustained in France in the 
national currency of that country. 
44 Notes 3 and 5 supra. 
45 See Part 11-D infra. 
46 Jbid.; and Part IV-C infra. 
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country.47 However, a growing opposition soon came into exist-
ence in the United States.48 At present, to a large extent the views 
expressed in the early post-World War I New York decisions, 
47 See the New York cases cited in note 35 supra. It is, however, doubtful whether such 
later cases as Parker v. Hoppe, 257 N.Y. 333, 178 N.E. 550 (1931), rearg. denied 258 N.Y. 
365; 179 N.E. 770 (1932), and Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 266 N.Y. 
71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934), although frequently cited among the leading breach-day de-
cisions, are to the same effect. Some of the principles expressed therein come very close 
to the doctrine which led to the adoption of the judgment-day rule. See the following 
note. 
48 Sirie v. Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N.Y.S. 52 (1921); Metcalf Co. v. Mayer, 
213 App. Div. 607, 211 N.Y.S. 53 (1925); Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 
272 U.S. 517, 47 S.Ct. 166 (1926); Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253, 47 S.Ct. 625 
(1927); Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), 241 N.Y. 163, 149 N.E: 338 (1925). 
These cases reject the "commodity concept" with respect to valuations of foreign cur-
rency functioning as money. See also Richard v. American Union Bank (2d case), 
253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E. 532 (1930). It was particularly under the influence of the two 
Richard decisions and of the Humphrey case, supra, that the New York Court of 
Appeals decisions began to vacillate. In Parker v. Hoppe, 257 N.Y. 333, 178 N.E. 550 
(1931), rearg. denied 258 N.Y. 365, 179 N.E. 770 (1932), based on the purchaser's rescis-
sion of a wholly Russian contract between two Russian parties for the delivery of goods, 
plaintiff was entitled to a refund of 100,000 roubles originally paid on account of the 
purchase price. Plaintiff argued that the judgment award in dollars should be computed 
at the rate of exchange of the roubles prevailing ori the day when the payment had 
been made to the seller. The court, holding (p. 341) that "damages upon breach of 
contract are to be measured as of the day of the breach, as a general ·rule," and that 
this also applied to a rescission, decided that the time of the rescission was the proper 
date. But, thereafter (258 N.Y. 366), Judge Crane, writing the opinion, examined the 
hypothetical question that could have been raised if "defendant upon the plaintiff's 
demand had paid back the 100,000 roubles," and continued: "They would have been 
received in Russia in the money of that country. No account would have been taken 
of depreciation. If upon receiving them the plaintiff had immediately brought his 
rubles to New York, he could only have gotten for them their value in our money at 
that time. No one here would have given him their value as it was a year before." 
The difficulty is that there was no indication that the parties contemplated or that 
they might have been reasonably expected in the ordinary course of their business to 
transfer the rubles to New York at that or any other time. Yet, the rescission-day 
valuation placed the plaintiff in the same position as if that had been the case. In the 
subsequent decision, denying the motion for reargument and refasing to value the rubles 
as of the original payment day, Judge Crane (p. 367) distinguished plaintiff's claim for 
repayment of a sum of money from a contract to deliver a commodity: "The parties in 
this contract were dealing with money as money. Had property of any other nature been 
given to the seller, on rescission he would have been obliged to return the identical 
property or replace it in value as of the time received less natural deterioration, cost 
of keep and like deductions." It is submitted that under this reasoning, endorsing the 
nominalistic principle, a judgment-day conversion would have been more appropriate 
under ordinary circumstances (see Part 111-B and C, infra). A few years later, in 
Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 266 N.Y. 71 at 81, 193 N.E. 897 (1934), 
Judge Crane cited with approval the view of Justice Holmes in Deutsche Bank Filiale 
Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 at 519, 47 S.Ct. 166 (1926), one of the leading 
judgment-day cases based on the view that it is not within the province of the lex fori 
to award damages where they are not permissible under the controlling law, and that 
"the obligation is not enlarged by the fact that the creditor happens to be able to catch· 
his debtor here." (See Part 11-C and note 51 infra.) Judge Crane correctly concludes 
that "the right to a sum of money due upon contract is to be determined by the terms 
of that contract the world over." Certain doubts arising from these two decisions deal-
ing with ruble obligations may be due to the particular circumstances resulting from 
the complete collapse of the Russian currency system. (Note particularly that the ques-
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adopting the breach or maturity-day rule as the general rule, here-
in referred to as the single rule doctrine, no longer appear to be 
authoritative.49 
C. The Two-Rule Doctrine 
In the course of a re-examination of the results of the single 
rule principle, some of the legal distinctions between monetary 
and non-monetary obligations, and between domestic and foreign 
money came to the foreground. 50 In this connection the place of 
payment was believed to be particularly important.51 
tion of a judgment-day conversion was not even raised in the Parker case.) Such break-
downs of a currency system must be distinguished from a mere depreciation. See Part 
IV-B (2) infra. With respect to rubles see also Tillman v. National City Bank of New 
York, (2d Cir. 1941) ll8 F. (2d) 631; and Rashba, "Debts in Collapsed Foreign Cur-
rencies," 54 YALE L J. I (1944). 
49 United Shellac Corp. v. Jordan, 277 App. Div. 147, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 817 (1950); 
Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 279 App. Div. 386, IIO N.Y.S. (2d) 446 (1952), revd. 
on other grounds 304 N.Y. 533, IIO N.E. (2d) 6 (1953); Buxhoeveden v. Estonian State 
Bank, 106 N.Y.S. (2d) 287 (1951); In re Manus' Estate, 106 N.Y.S. (2d) 102 (1951); 
Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, no N.Y.S. (2d) 383 (1952), 
affd. without op. 304 N.Y. 942, no N.E. (2d) 884 (1953), and in general Part III infra. 
Professor Nussbaum's apprehension (note 22 supra, at 373), that after the English model 
the breach-day rule might be adopted by New York courts may prove to be unfounded. 
(The justification of the judgment-day conversion in Bonnell v. Von Schultz, 197 Misc. 
756, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 617 (1950), and of the breach-day valuation in Taubenfeld v. Tauben-
feld, 198 Misc. 108, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 158 (1950), appears to be doubtful.] The endorsement 
of the breach-day rule in the De Sayve case, mentioned in note I supra, may be due to 
an error. In this case the larger part of the underlying obligation was and remained 
a dollar debt, with respect to which no valuation problem was involved in an American 
court, unless our courts were required to give effect to a French law by virtue of which 
this dollar obligation was to be converted into francs as of a certain date. It is only 
in the event that this French law, based on the French cours force doctrine mentioned in 
note 208, is not contrary to our public policy that the underlying obligation became a 
franc debt. If this was the case and the francs were owed to a French citizen the court 
seems to have erred in testing the righteousness of the outcome in dollars, rather than 
francs, where no loss in our national currency seems to have been sustained. Conse-
quently, the problem hinges on the following two problems: was the respective French 
law calling for the conversion of the dollars into francs contrary to our public policy? Was 
the obligation to be measured in dollars or in francs? If the obligation remained a dollar 
debt the outcome giving plaintiff a dollar for dollar was correct, although the court's 
theory, based on the inapplicable breach-day rule, was wholly unjustified and uncalled 
for. If, however, the obligation became a franc debt under the French law, if this law 
is not cop.trary to our public policy, and if plaintiff can prove no special damages in our 
national currency, then under our law the application of the breach-day rule giving 
plaintiff about thirteen times as much as he would have been able to obtain in a French 
court is a clear windfall. The breach-day conversion is absolutely unjustifiable with re-
spect to the remaining part of the underlying obligation, a sterling debt. On the ques-
tion of public policy and other details of this case see notes 208 and 258 infra. 
50 See Part II-A and Part III-B infra. 
51 It was erroneously assumed that the place of payment always offered an easy test 
with respect to the following matters: (a) Determination of the controlling law. (b) Classi-
fication of the currency as foreign, or as a commodity, with respect to the question of 
damages for its depreciation. See CONFLICT OF LAws R.EsrATEMENT §423 (1934); BEALE, 
note 22 supra, §423.I. See Part III-B infra. (c) Determination of the currency in which 
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Under our law an obligation for payment of a sum of our do-
mestic money remains unaffected by the depreciation of the dol-
lar, whether it occurs before or after maturity.52 A reduction in 
the purchasing power of the dollar or a deterioration of its rate 
of exchange in terms of another foreign exchange does not give 
rise to any claim of damages. This nominalistic concept was as-
sumed to have become a part of the laws of all civilized countries 
with respect to obligations payable within their territory in their 
national currency (e. g., German marks in Germany).53 Conse-
quently, in such situations where the obligation was expressed in 
damages for the depreciation of money were to be measured. See Part m-D infra. It 
was on the theory that the question of damages resulting from a breach of contract was 
governed by the law of the place of performance that in Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 
at 80, 46 S.Ct. 46 (1925), where the debt was due to an American creditor and was to be 
paid in the United States, it was held that the extent of the secondary obligation was gov-
erned by American law. See also Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253 at 255-256, 
47 S.Ct. 625 (1927); and Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 266 N.Y. 71 at 80, 
193 N.E. 897 (1934). However, a statement to this effect in the latter appears to be a 
mere dictum, as it was stipulated that Russian law should govern. The validity of this 
controversial conflict of laws doctrine, although favored by numerous writers and adopted 
by the Conflicts Restatement, §§372, 413, appears to be highly doubtful, insofar as it 
may affect the substance of the obligation (as distinguished from a mere mode of per-
formance) in disregard of the proper law of contract. See 2 RABEL, THE CoNFLicr OF 
LAws 466 (1947); NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, at 148; MANN, note 8 supra, at 289; Revillon 
v. Demme, 114 Misc. I, 185 N.Y.S. 443 at 445 (1920); Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists 
Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 383 (1952), affd. 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E. (2d) 
884 (1953) [question of d;unages for breach of an American contract for payment of a sum 
of money current at the foreign place of performance decided under our law; but see 
interpretation of this case in CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs (1953 Supp.) §1005, p. 6, n. 72, favor-
ing the law of the forum, criticized in Part IV-A infra]; and Pavenstedt v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., 203 N.Y. 91 at 96, 96 N.E. 104 (1911), one of the leading cases on the 
doctrine of re-exchange [ damages for the loss from the dishonor of bills drawn in this 
country upon a foreign place controlled by our law; contra: STORY, CoNFLicr OF LAws, 
8th ed., c. VIII, §314, pp. 438-444 (1883), suggesting that this is not "a departure from 
the rule that the law of the place of payment is to govern," because the bill of exchange 
should not be construed to set forth a foreign place of payment but to contain merely 
a guarantee of acceptance and payment at such place]. See also Swift & Co. v. Bankers 
Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135 at 140-145, 19 N.E. (2d) 992 (1939). This conflict of laws prob-
lem exceeds the scope of this paper. 
52 Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 4 S.Ct. 122 (1884); Norman v. Baltimore & 
Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S.Ct. 407 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 
55 S.Ct. 428 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct. 432 (1935); Deutsche 
Bank Filiale Numberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 47 S.Ct. 166 (1926). See also Part 
IV-B (1) and D infra. 
53 See Deutsche Bank Filiale Numberg v. Humphrey, note 52 supra, in which 
Justice Holmes states (at p. 519) with respect to an obligation controlled by German 
law for payment of marks on deposit with a German bank in Germany: "We may 
assume that when the bank failed to pay on demand its liability was fixed at a certain 
number of marks both by the terms of the contract and by the German law-but we 
also assume that it was fixed in marks only, not at the extrinsic value that those marks 
then had in commodities or in the currency of another country. On the contrary, we 
repeat, it was and continued to be a liability in marks alone and was open to satis-
faction by the payment of that number of marks, at any time, with whatever interest 
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the money of the foreign place of payment and particularly where 
the obligation was controlled by the law of such foreign country, 
our courts assumed no damages were recoverable in the courts of 
the foreign country of payment. The foreign currency was treated 
as "money," rather than a "commodity." It was also emphasized 
that the creditor should not be placed in a better position merely 
by bringing an action in an American court.54 Hence, a valuation 
of the foreign money in our national currency at the judgment 
(trial)-day rate of exchange was expected to give the proper equiv-
alent in dollars, in which our judgments are to be expressed Gudg-
, ment-day rule). 
A different situation was felt to exist where the obligation was 
expressed in a currency foreign to the place of performance.55 In 
this case, after a default in payment, the foreign money was be-
lieved to be comparable at least to some extent to a mere com-
modity .56 Where an American creditor was entitled to an amount 
of German marks payable in this country he may have sold them 
for dollars at the price (rate of exchange) prevailing in the Amer-
ican market on maturity day. Therefore, where there was a de-
cline in the rate of exchange of the marks after the debtor's default 
in payment the creditor's loss should ·be measured in dollars 
might have accrued, however much the mark might have fallen in value as compared 
with other things. See Societe des H6tels le Touquet Paris-Plage v. Cummings, (1922) 
I K.B. 451. An obligation, in terms of the rurrency of a country takes the risk of cur-
rency fluctuations and whether creditor or debtor profits by the change the law takes 
no account of it. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457, 548, 549. Obviously, in 
fact a dollar or a mark may have different values at different times but to the law that 
establishes it it is always the same. If the debt had been due here and the value of 
dollars had dropped before suit was brought the plaintiff could recover no more 
dollars on that account. A foreign debtor should be no worse off." This nominalistic 
view, resulting from an inaccurate application of our "domestic money rule" to an 
obligation expressed in foreign money, appears to be subject to serious criticism, both 
under our own law, and under the controlling foreign law. See Part IV-D infra. Moreover, 
the German "revalorization" (discussed in Part IV-B (2) infra) does not appear to have 
been pleaded (NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra,· at 359, n. 93). Subsequently the American 
creditor was indemnified for his loss from depreciation of the mark in proceedings 
before the Mixed Claims Commission under the Peace Treaty of 1921 [see 5 HACK-
woRnI, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 735 (1943)]. However, this inaccuracy, although 
important in another respect (Part IV-D), detracts little from the general importance 
of this leading federal decision, recognizing that the question of damages is controlled 
by the applicable foreign substantive law and not by the law of the forum. See Part IV-A, 
infra. 
54 The Humphrey case, 272 U.S. 517 at 519, 47 S.Ct. 166 (1926). 
55 Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71, 46 S.Ct. 46 (1952). CONFLicrs REsTATEMENT §423 
(1934); 2 BEALE, note 22 supra, §423.I. See also note 51 supra, and Part Ill-B infra. 
56 Ibid.; Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), 241 N.Y. 163 at 166, 167, 149 
N.E. 338 (1925), interpreting the decision in Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37, 
138 N.E. 497 (1923). 
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(rather than marks) as of the time and place of the stipulated 
performance, i.e., at the maturity (breach) date rate of exchange 
(breach-day rule).67 
This led to the view that there were in fact two rules. The 
breach or maturity-day rule applicable where the value of money 
not currency of the state of performance was to be measured; the 
judgment-day rule where the obligation based on a foreign cause 
of action was expressed in the national currency of the foreign 
place of payment.68 Under this view, referred to herein as the two-
rule doctrine, the place of payment became the test for the appli-
cation of one or the other rule. 
Under the mechanics of this two-rule doctrine no damages 
could be recovered by an American creditor for the depreciation 
of marks payable in Germany.69 However, the doctrine permits 
· damages where the marks are payable in this country.60 The differ-
ent treatment of these two situations may be contrary to the con-
templation of the parties. In both instances the American creditor 
may have intended to convert the marks into his national currency 
upon payment at maturity. In the absence of prohibitive exchange 
control restrictions he may have sold the marks for dollars at their 
maturity rate of exchange had timely payment been made, irrespec-
tive of the place of performance. This was recognized in several 
leading decisions clearly concluding that the fact that the foreign 
money was the national currency of the place of payment did not 
-preclude the recovery of damages for its depreciation after a default 
in payment. 61 
57 Hicks v. Guinness, note 55 supra. 
58 Royal Ins. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, (D.C. N.Y. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 
288 at 291, 292; Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Arauca Fund, (D.C. Fla. 1948) 84 F. Supp. 516; 
Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 952; Paris 
v. Central Chiclera, (5th Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 960 at 962; United Shellac Corp. v. Jor-
dan, 277 App. Div. 147, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 817 (1950); Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 
279 App. Div. 386, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 446 (1952), revd. on other grounds 304 N.Y. 533, 110 
N.E. (2d) 6 (1953); Buxhoeveden v. Estonian State Bank, 106 N.Y.S. (2d) 287 (1951); 
Bonell v. Von Schultz, 197 Misc. 756, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 617 (1950); CONFLICTS R.EsrATEMENT 
§§423, 424 (1934); BEALE, note 22 supra, §§423.1, 424.1; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., 
§1410A (1937); 15 AM. JUR., Damages §§60, 63 (1938); NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, 
at 367, 368. Some of these authorities stress the additional conflict of laws requirement, 
that the obligation must be controlled by foreign law, as a prerequisite for the application 
of the judgment-day rule. On this subject see notes 48 and 51 supra. Moreover, in United 
Shellac Corp. v. Jordan, supra, Justice Van Voorhis added (at p. 823) that "the conversion 
privilege is confined to a time which would not benefit" the party at fault. On this sub-
ordination of the mechanical rules to the requirement of "justice," see Part III-A, and 
note 75 infra. 
59 Note 53 supra. 
60 Note 55 supra. 
61 See Part III-B and C infra. 
1956 ]- FOREIGN MONEY OBLIGATIONS 323 
It is not intended to deny that the place of payment may some-
times be a reliable basis for a presumption as to the intentions of 
the parties. 
The error of the two-rule doctrine rests in that it would make 
the presumption conclusive, rather than rebuttable. The place of 
payment is just as unsuitable as a conclusive criterion for the de-
termination of whether damages for depreciation of a currency are 
recoverable as it is for its classification as domestic or foreign. 
The two-rule doctrine is a composition of the breach-day and 
the judgment-day rules. Besides being afflicted with some defects 
peculiar to itself it also suffers from the inadequacy of its com-
ponent parts. The vagaries of its mechanics become even clearer 
if once more the effect of the inflexible laws of arithmetic is taken 
into consideration. As in the case of the mechanical breach-day 
rule they will affect the outcome. Under the mechanized judg-
ment-day rule the situation is only reversed. Here the depreciation 
of the money whose value is being measured (mensuratum)-in 
our example the marks-in terms of another currency (mensura)-
in our example the dollar-works to the detriment of the creditor.62 
The depreciation of the latter may give him an advantage. The 
outcome still remains a matter of chance.63 
D. The Two Different Breach-Day Rules 
The breach-day rules as adopted in England64 and in the earlier 
New York decisions65 appear to be of a different character. Iri view 
of the weight given to the English law by our courts this difference 
must be briefly explained in order to avoid confusion. 
In both the valuation date was grounded on the commodity 
concept of money and on the view that the mode of computing 
value of foreign currency was based upon damages for breach of 
contract to deliver the commodity bargained for at the appointed 
62The Humphrey case, 272 U.S. 517, 47 S.Ct. 166 (1926); Bonell v. Von Schultz, 197 
Misc. 756, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 617 (1950). 
63 See Part I and Part 11-B supra. 
64Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smith & Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409; Celia v. Volturno, [1921] 
2 A.C. 544; Vionnet v. Wills, [1939] 4 All E.R. 136; [1940] 1 K.B. 72; Cummings v. Lon-
don Bullion Co., [1952] 1 All E.R. 383. See also DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 6th ed., Rule 
165 (3), p. 745 (1949); and notes of Professor Kahn-Freund, 68 L. Q. REv. 163 (1952); and 
Mann, 15 Mon. L. REv. 369 (1952). 
65 Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Banlc, 235 N.Y. 37, 138 N.E. 497 (1923); Petkus v. Lietuvos 
Ukio Bankas, 123 Misc. 193, 204 N.Y.S. 726 at 729 (1924); Kantor v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 
222 App. Div. 502, 226 N.Y.S. 582, affd. 248 N.Y. 630, 162 N.E. 553 (1928); Sokoloff v. 
National City Bank, 250 N.Y. 69, 164 N.E. 745 (1928). 
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time and place.66 However, from this point on the American 
and English decisions followed a different course. 
In England the loss from depreciation of foreign money was 
held to be "too remote a consequence of the breach to be taken 
into consideration."67 
If this view had been also based on the commodity concept of 
money it may not have constituted an exception to the general 
rule on damages for breach of contract to deliver goods. The ques-
tion of proximity of the cause would have remained primarily 
one of fact.68 If, under a different factual situation, the loss were 
found not to be too remote, damages for depreciation of foreign 
money would be permissible. 
However, the remoteness seems to have been based on the con-
trary view that foreign money is not a commodity. The loss from 
depreciation of foreign money appears to have been considered 
too remote, as a matter of law, rather than fact. In other words, 
it became one of the basic principles of the English law, at least 
as it now appears to stand, that damages for depreciation of foreign 
money are not recoverable.69 
On the other hand, in the earlier New York decisions, any 
mention of the question of remoteness of the loss from deprecia-
66 See note 34 supra. 
67 Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smith & Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409 at 415, per Sa-utton, L. J.; 
similarly in Celia v. Volturno, ·[1921] 2 A.C. 544 at 561, per Lord Parmoor. 
68 McCORMICK, DAMAGES 560-562 (1935); 1 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES, 4th ed., c. 3, 
§§15, 16, 48, 49 (1916); 1 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, 9th ed., c. VIII, §§138-143 (1912). 
69 Celia v. Volturno, [1921] 2 A.C. 544 at 558 (per Lord Sumner), stating, "Fluctua-
tions in foreign exchange inevitably introduce a speculative element into all transactions 
and affairs, and, unless the parties themselves have provided for this by some contract, 
the law must apply the same principles as if they had remained stable." See also DICEY, 
note 64 supra, Rule 160. But see lower court decision in Mehmed Dogan Bey v. Abdeni 
&: Co., [1951] 2 All E. R. 162 (claim for damages resulting from devaluation of the pound 
sterling decided by arbitration), in which McNair, J., examined the question of whether 
the remoteness of the loss constituted a question of fact or of law; and the optimistic view, 
expressed in the new (1953) edition of Dr. Mann's book, note 8 supra, at 87 and 252, that 
the problem may be one of fact. Dr. Mann points out (p. 252) that it is not "inconceivable 
that upon proper proof of the necessary facts damages for delayed payment of a foreign 
currency debt will be recoverable in England." Unfortunately, as the English law now 
appears to stand, this still remains only a wish, however desirable it may be. If it should 
prevail, it would constitute a complete repudiation of the present English breach-day 
rule. This Inight lead to the adoption of, what this writer considers to be, the American 
rule, previously expressly rejected in Vionnet v. Wills, [1939] 4 All E.R. l!l6; [1940] I K.B. 
72 at 73, a case cited with approval even after the Abdeni decision, supra, in Cummings 
v. London Bullion Co., (1952] I All E.R. 383; East India Trading Co. v. Carmel Exporters 
and Importers, [1952] I All E.R. 1053 at 1056; and In re Russian Commercial and Indus-
trial Bank, [1955] I All E.R. 75 at 77, 78. With respect to sales of foreign exchange (as a 
commodity) Dr. Mann's optimistic view may be more in accordance with the present state 
of the Englisli law. See NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, at 344; Graveson, "The Discharge of 
Foreign Monetary Obligations in English Courts," in LEcruRES ON THE CoNFLicr OF LAws 
AND INTERNATIONAL CoNTRAcrs 113, 114 (University of Michigan, 1951). 
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tion of foreign money was conspicuously absent. They were based 
on the opposite view that such damages were permissible and that 
the breach-day valuation would indemnify the injured party.70 
Where this result was not obtained, it was mostly due to the in-
herent fallacies of the rule.71 
The foregoing considerations show that in fact the English 
breach-day rule is based on a contradiction. On one hand foreign 
money is treated as being subject to a different rule from com-
. modities. Damages for depreciation of foreign money are held 
not to be recoverable as a matter of law. On the other hand, how-
ever paradoxical this may appear to be, the determination of the 
date as of which the foreign money is to be valued is based on the 
"commodity-valuation rule," as if damages were recoverable. 
For many years there was serious doubt whether the breach-
day rule was limited to actions for unliquidated sums of money, 
such as may arise out of breach of contract, or tort, or whether it 
also applied to claims for liquidated amounts of money (debts).72 
In spite of its unsoundness, justly criticized by numerous writ-
ers, the present weight of English decisions still appears to con-
sider the breach-day rule equally applicable to both.73 
III. THE AMERICAN (NEw YoRK) RATIONAL RuLE 
A. Rejection of Mechanical Standards 
In this country the rules of damages have been relied upon 
more persistently. Contrary to England, the emphasis has been 
on reparation of the loss.74 The courts, although frequently 
70 See cases cited in note 65 supra; Gluck in 22 CoL. L. R.Ev. 217 at 249, 250 (1922); 
15 AM. JUR., Damages §60 (1938); 4 TORTS REsTATEMENT, c. 47, §911, comment (1939); 
CoNFLicr OF LAws REsTATEMENT §423 (1934); CONFLICT OF LAws REsTATEMENT, New York 
Annotations §423 (1935). To the same effect see also Melzer v. Zimmerman, 118 Misc. 
407, 194 N.Y.S. 222 at 224, 225 (1922); Strohmeyer & Arpe Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co. 
of New York, 172 App. Div. 16, 157 N.Y.S. 955 at 958 (1916). 
71 See Part II-B and C supra. However, in Sulka v. Brandt, 154 Misc. 534, 277 N.Y.S. 
421 at 422 (1935) in which the breach-day conversion worked to the benefit of the party 
at fault, because of the appreciation of the foreign money in terms of dollars, the per 
curiam opinion states that "the mere circumstance that the fluctuation of exchange 
went against the plaintiff would not seem to justify a departure from this rule." 
72 DICEY, supra note 64, Rule 165 (3); MANN, Tm: LEGAL AsPEcr OF MONEY, 1st ed., 
292, 301 (1938); In re Chesterman's Trusts, [1923] 2 Ch. 466, per Sterndale, M. R. and 
Warrington, L. J. 
73 Vionnet v. Wills; Cummings v. London Bullion Co.; East India Trading Co. v. 
Carmel Exporters and Importers; In re Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank, note 69 
supra; Grauman v. Treitel, [1940] 2 All E.R. 188; CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
4th ed., 663, 664 (1952); notes of Professor Kahn-Freund and Dr. Mann, cited in note 
64 supra; and :MANN, note 8 supra, at 319, 320. But see criticism of Mann's views in note 
69 supra. On certain exceptions to the rule, see note 247 infra. 
74 See the authorities cited in note 70; Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), 
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saying that they were applying the mechanical rules, in -fad.tested 
the result by examining whether it was "just."75 · This subordina-
tion of the mechanical rules to the r~quirement of "justice" in 
truth constituted their complete repudiation.76 Judging from 
what the courts did, it will be found that they reverted to the basic 
principles from the oversimplification of which the erroneous rules 
had been derived.77 The following analysis shows what these prin-
ciples are and what outcome is "just." 
241 N.Y. 163, 149 N.E. 338 (1925); (2d case) 253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E. 532 (1930); Hicks 
v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 at 80, 46 S.Ct. 46 (1925), based on the leading federal case on 
consequential damages, Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 23 S.Ct. 
754 (1903); Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 
383 (1952), affd. 304 N.Y. 9421 110 N.E. (2d) 884 (1953); Ghuneim & Co. v. Southwestern 
Shipping Corp., 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 303 at 307-308, 17 A. (2d) 1300 (1953); 5 CORBIN, CON· 
TRACTS 53 (1951); 5 Wll.LISroN, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., §1410A (1937); McCORMICK, DAMAGF.S 
203, 204 (1935); Rifkind, "Money as a Device for Measuring Value," 26 CoL. L. R.Ev. 559 
at 587 (1926); Drake, "The Proper Rule in Fluctuating Exchanges," 28 MICH. L. REv. 
229 at 242, 249 (1930). 
75 Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 952 
at 956, emphasizing that "the judgment-day rule yields a just result in this case" (but 
see note 150 infra); Matter of Heck, 203 Misc. 788, 116 N.Y.S. (2d) 255 at 258-259 (1952) 
(considering the equities of the outcome); United Shellac Corp. v. Jordan, 277 App. Div. 
147, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 817 at 822, in which, after having restated the two mechanical rules 
(see Part II-C supra), Van Voorhis, J., concluded that under the established law upon 
this subject the conversion privilege was confined to a time which would not benefit the 
party at fault. [This well-meant statement is not quite accurate and requires some limita-
tion. In accordance with the general principles of our law "damages must be calculated 
on the basis of plaintiff's loss and not on the basis of defendant's gain." See Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Tailored Woman, Inc., 283 App. Div. 173, 126 N.Y.S. (2d) 
573 at 578 (1953), motion for rearg. denied, 283 App. Div. 1030, 131 N.Y.S. (2d) 866 
(1954).] See also 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1338, p. 3763 (1937), saying that the 
general purpose of the law is and should be, to give compensation; McCORMICK, note 
74 supra, at 560; and the passage in note 80 infra; Eder, "Legal Theories of Money," 
20 CoRN. L. Q. 52, stressing the desirability of placing the injured party in as good a 
position as he would have been in had there been no breach or wrong; the suggestions 
in 36 MINN. L. REv. 968 at 971, 972 (1952); and note 76 infra. 
76 Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 383 at 
389 (1952), affd. without op. 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E. (2d) 884 (1953). In this case an 
obligation expressed in the currency of a foreign place of payment was converted into 
dollars, at the breach-day rate of exchange. Citing Orlik v. Wiener Bank Verein, 204 
App. Div. 432, 198 N.Y.S. 413 (1923), Van Voorhis, J., pointed out that "that conclusion 
appea!5 to be correct under the facts of this case" and continued: "Although the con-
tract was to be performed abroad in terms of foreign currencies, plaintiff's principal 
place of business is in· the United States, and the circumstances indicate that in the nor-
mal course of business it would have reduced the foreign funds to United States currency 
as soon as it was entitled to receive them and to the extent that it would have been able 
to do so." Witli respect to the Orlik case, see Part IV-D, and notes 253 and 254 infra. 
Under the mechanized "two rule doctrine" the currency of the foreign place of payment 
would have been valued at the judgment-day rate of exchange. See Part II-C supra. 
77 This seems to have been recognized by Judge Van Voorhis in the Hughes Tool 
Company case, note 76 supra, at 389. He states: "when applied to particular factual 
situations there may be less discrepancy than is commonly supposed between the New 
York decisions and the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court (Deutsche 
Bank v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 519), the American Law Institute (Restatement, Con-
flict of Laws, §424) and indorsed by Professor Williston (5 Williston on Contracts, §1410A). 
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B. Importance of Proper Classification of Money 
The difficulty of the problem discussed in this paper lies pri-
marily in whether damages for depreciation of the foreign money 
after default in terms of another currency are permissible. This, 
in turn, may depend on whether, under what circumstances, and 
to what extent, for this limited purpose, foreign money is com-
parable to a commodity.78 
The solution of this problem was found not to rest solely in 
the inherent nature of foreign money but in the contemplation 
of the parties. Although there is some similarity with the prob-
lem of determination of what money is to be classified as foreign, 79 
the characterization as foreign, by itself, may not justify a recov-
ery of damages.80 
In Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case)81 in considera-
tion of a sum of dollars, defendant's predecessor agreed to open a 
credit in Roumanian lei in Bucharest, for the benefit of plaintiff, 
a New York banker. The lei, or the credit of lei, were the object 
of the transaction. Although acq'll,ired as a commodity, it was held 
that where the credit was to be opened in Roumania, it must be 
assumed in the absence of "special circumstances," that when the 
contract was made the lei were intended to be used "as money in 
the country where it is the recognized medium of exchange."82 
Because of this intended use as money, damages for delayed pay-
ment were held not to be recoverable (nominalism). 
When it was shown in a subsequent action, based on the same 
breach, that in this transaction between these two New York banks 
In Shaw, Savill, Albion b Co. v. The Fredericksburg (189 F. 2d 952) the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals in this circuit appears to have considered that the customary 
generalizations upon this subject are oversimplified.'' With respect to the basic principles 
from the oversimplification of which the putative rules were derived, see Part III-C, D 
and G, and Part IV-A, C and D infra. 
78 See Part II-A supra. 
79lbid. 
so Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), 241 N.Y. 163, 149 N.E. 338 (1925). 
See also McCoRMICK, note 74 supra, §49, p. 190, suggesting that it should be determined 
"in each case whether under the circumstances it is fair to apportion to the creditor 
or to the debtor the risk of fluctuations in the foreign currency, considering the nationality 
of the parties and the nature of the transaction.'' 
Similar considerations may have led to the adoption of Art. 115 (8) of tit. II, c. I 
(Regulations) of the Universal Postal Convention signed at Brussels on July 11, 1952. 
It provides in substance that a creditor country is entitled to damages for depreciation 
of the debtor country's currency, if the loss was caused by an unjustifiable delay in pay-
ment. Both the United States and the United Kingdom are parties to said convention. 
See also note 242 infra. 
81241 N.Y. 163 at 168, 149 N.E. 338 (1925). 
82lbid. 
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"both patties understood that the commodity was purchased here 
for resale as a commodity in the market here,". damages for delayed 
performance were held to be permissible.83 
Another illustrative example of the importance of the contem-
plated use of the foreign currency and of the changing characteriza-
tion thereof for different purposes may be found in Hicks v. 
Guinness.84 Here the underlying transaction was a foreign currency 
debt expressed i11, German marks. The marks payable in this coun-
try to an American creditor functioned (were acquired) as money 
(measure of value) a1:1,d were to be treated as such until the ma-
turity of the obligation. It was until then that the obligation 
may have been discharged by payment of the nominal amount 
of marks no matter how much they may have depreciated in the 
intervening time (nominalism). 
However, a different situation arose after a default in payment. 
It appears that the parties understood that, had timely payment 
been made, the American creditor would have converted the marks 
into his own national currency by selling the marks in the Amer-
ican market for dollars. Because of this contemplated use of the 
marks it was proper to permit him to treat the German currency 
as a commodity from that moment on. The loss from its deprecia-
tion in terms of dollars after maturity was held to be recoverable. 
This shows that foreign money, even where acquired as the 
object of the transaction ( commodity) may be intended to be used 
(expended) as medium of exchange (money). Where this is the 
case no loss from its depreciation after the stipulated time of per-
formance may have been sustained, and no damages may have 
been contemplated;85 In this respect the situation is analogous 
to that in which the foreign currency had been acquired and in-
tended to be used as money. 
On the other hand, even where the foreign money had been 
acquired as a medium of exchange (money, foreign currency 
debt), the creditor may have intended to use it as a commodity. 
In this event its depreciation may have caused him a loss.86 
83 Richard v. American Union Bank (2d case), 253 N.Y. 166 at 175, 170 N.E. 532 
(1930). The opinion points out, "The fact that the commodity purchased for resale here 
might in a foreign country be used as a medium of exchange becomes irrelevant when it 
appears that the parties understood that the purchase was made by the plaintiffs not for 
use in Roumania but for resale here." The value of performance was held to be fixed by 
the price in the American market in which the lei were intended to be resold. 
84 269 U.S. 71 at 80, 46 S.Ct. 46 (1925). 
8li Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), note 81 supra. 
86 Hicks v. Guinness, note 84 supra; Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., note 
76 supra. 
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Similarly where the foreign money had been acquired and in-
tended to be used as the object of both the underlying and of the 
intended future transaction (American contract to open a credit 
of leis in Roumania for resale for dollars in New York), its depre-
ciation after the stipulated time of performance may have caused 
a loss to the innocent party.87 
In two of these situations the characterization of the foreign 
currency as "money" or "commodity" was changing in accordance 
with the different purposes for which the classification was re-
quired. 
However, where the underlying transaction was a foreign cur-
rency debt (rather than a sale of, or an executory contract to open 
credit in foreign money in consideration of payment of domestic 
money), the creditor has certain additional rights. 
Placing him in a position comparable to that of a purchaser of 
goods for all purposes would be contrary to the particular nature 
of the original obligation (a foreign currency debt) and may not 
do justice. If this commodity concept of money were to be applied 
in all respects it. might reduce the quantum of the obligation 
where the creditor's own national currency had depreciated. The 
problem was solved by Justice Holmes in Hicks v. Guinness, point-
ing out that the creditor had an option of proceeding either in 
debt or for breach of contract.88 
The former would permit him to recover the equivalent of 
the primary obligation.89 The latter creates a new and different 
secondary obligation to be measured in the currency in which the 
loss had been sustained (substantive conversion).90 The dis-
tinction between these two causes of action is analyzed further 
below.91 
The foregoing analysis shows that damages for delayed pay-
ment or delivery of foreign currency are not limited to situations 
in which the foreign currency was acquired as a commodity; 
87 Richard v. American Union Bank (2d case), note 83 supra. 
88 269 U.S. 71 at 80, 46 S.Ct. 46 (1925): "When the contract was broken by a failure 
to pay, the American firm had a claim here, not for the debt, but, at its option, for dam• 
ages in dollars. It no longer could be compelled to accept marks. It had a right to say 
to the debtors 'You are too late to perform what you have promised, and we want the 
dollars to which we have a right by the law here in force.' " Italics added. See also com• 
ment in note 138 infra. 
89 See Part III-F infra. 
90 See Part ill-D, E, and Part IV-A infra. 
91 Part III-E, F, G (2), H infra. 
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and that wh~th~r the foreign currency functions as money or com-
modity at the time of its acquisition, it may or may not be intended 
to continue to function as such. 
C. Effect of Doctrine of Consequential Damages 
The emphasis on the contemplation of the parties is based on 
the doctrine of consequential damages.92 The courts are consider-
ing whether the_loss was foreseeable, being the usual result of the 
breach or wrong, or whether, although unusual, it was within the 
contemplation of the parties.93 
Hicks v. Guinness, decided by the United States Supreme Court, 
expressly relies on Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oi_l Co., 
· one of the leading cases on the doctrine of consequential dam-
;;i.ges.94 
92 With respect to the doctrine of consequential damages, as developed from the Eng-
lish decision in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), see 5 WILLIS· 
TON, CONTRAC'I'S, rev. ed., §§1355-1357 (1937); I SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES, 4th ed., §§45-52, 
170-207 (1916); McCoRMICK, note 74 supra, at 566-568, pointing out that this doctrine, 
while occasionally criticized, has been accepted by the courts, some codes, and the Amer-
ican Law Institute, Restatement of Contracts §330. See also the emphasis on "foresee-
ability" in 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAC'I'S §§997, 998 (1951). 
93 See the authorities cited in note 74 supra. It should be noted that this constitutes 
an exception to the general rule that damages for delay in payment of a debt, as dis-
tinguished from a contract to open a credit, are limited to interest. Analyzing this prob-
lem under Czechoslovak law, Kubes in "Komentar k Ceskoslovenskemu Obecnemu 
Zakoniku Obcanskemu" (1937) (Commentary on the Czechoslovak Civil Code), Vol. V, 
p. 962, points out that currency depreciation is an extraordinary phenomenon not 
covered by the provisions of said code (i.e., Austrian Civil Code of 1811, as amended, 
§1333, in effect in Czechoslovakia until December 31, 1950) dealing with moratory in-
terest. The same conclusion was reached by Professor Sedlacek (id., Vol. IV, p. 324). 
Examining the effect of "subjective mora" (culpable delay, or default), he states that 
with respect to monetary obligations the debtor's liability is not restricted to statutory 
interest but extends "as the courts are now constantly deciding, to the loss sustained by 
the creditor as the result of a decline of the rate of exchange of money." He states fur-
ther, "In this instance the courts have exceptionally adopted the principle that with 
respect to monetary obligations it is not the nominal sum of currency units but their 
abstract monetary value, which is not determined by the nominal (numerical) amount 
of currency units that is owed." (Translation mine. It includes a certain inaccuracy of 
the language of the original text with respect to the "abstract monetary value.") No mat-
ter how correct under the Czechoslovak law, this further view of Professor Sedlacek ex-
ceeds th~ scope of damages recoverable under the New York law, insofar as it goes beyond 
the limits of the doctrine of consequential damages. Under the present state of the 
English law the question of whether damages for depreciation of foreign money are in-
cluded in the payment of interest, raised in In re Chesterman's Trusts, [1923] 2 Ch. 466 
at 479, 485, per Lord Sterndale, M. R., and Warrington, L. J., seems to require a negative 
answer. In England no damages are recoverable irrespective of whether interest was to 
be paid. See Societe des Hotels Le Touque_t Paris-Plage v. Cummings, [1922] 1 K.B. 451 at 
460, and in general Part II-D supra. 
94 Both cited in note 74 supra. 
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The decisions in the two Richard cases,9° decided by the New 
York Court of Appeals with respect to the sufficiency of the plead-
ings, are based on the same doctrine.96 They become clearer if it 
is considered that the distinction between losses foreseeable as 
the result of the breach and those, which although unusual, are 
within the contemplation of the parties·"corresponds rather closely 
with the distinction between 'general' and 'special' damages, in 
the sense of those which need not, and those which must be, spe-
cially claimed in the pleadings."97 
The original Richard action was dismissed for insufficiency be-
cause the loss was not pleaded as "special damages."98 In the ab-
sence of a pleading of "special circumstances" that the parties 
either contemplated a liability for damages for depreciation of 
foreign money payable where current when measured by our own 
currency, or that in fact such depreciation did cause plaintiff any 
damage, the complaint was held not to set forth facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action.99 
In other words, the loss was not considered to be such a usual 
consequence of the breach as would fall within the scope of "gen-
eral damages." When in the subsequent action based on the same 
breach such special circumstances had been pleaded, the complaint 
was held to be sufficient. The distinction between the two de-
cisions lies solely in the pleading of the relevant facts.100 
As above stated, damages for depreciation of foreign currency 
are not limited to instances where such currency was acquired as 
a commodity.101 However, most frequently, where the currency 
foreign to the forum was acquired as money (debt), compensation 
for its depreciation in terms of another currency was not contem-
plated (nominalism).102 This is particularly so where the money 
95 Ibid. 
96 To the same effect see note, 52 CoL. L. REv. 141 at 142 (1952). 
97 McCORMICK, note 74 supra, at 566. 
98 Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), 210 App. Div. 22, 205 N.Y.S. 622 at 
627-628 (1924), affd. 241 N.Y. 163, 149 N.E. 338 (1925). 
99 Ibid., 241 N.Y.S. 163 at 168. 
100 Richard v. American Union Bank (2d case), 253 N.Y. 166 at 175, 170 N.E. 532 
(1930). See also note 83 supra. It should be noted that under the mechanical valuation 
rules there was no room for this question of pleading. However, under the present 
rational doctrine the conclusion reached in the first Richard case that the loss must be 
pleaded as special damages appears to be correct and most salutary. It will secure com-
pensation where proper and prevent windfall awards where no loss was sustained or 
contemplated. See note 248 infra. 
101 See Part 111-B supra. . 
102 Such was the situation in Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 279 App. Div. 386, 
ll0 N.Y.S. (2d) 446 (1952), revd. on other grounds, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E. (2d) 6 (action 
in an American court based on a wholly Czechoslovak contract between two nationals 
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foreign to the forum is payable in the country of which it is the 
currency to one of its nationals. 
Where, however, the conversion into another currency was with-
in the contemplation of the parties, the place of payment may be of 
lesser or no importance.103 In· this respect a comparison of the de-
cisions in Hicks v. Guinness104 and Hughes Tool Co. v. United Ar-
tists Corp.105 is illustrative. Correctly or incorrectly, both were 
considered to be controlled by our law.106 In both, foreign money 
was payable to an American creditor assumed to have intended 
to convert the same into dollars (his own national currency). 
They differed with respect to the place of payment. In the 
Hicks case the marks were payable_ in the United States, where 
they are foreign money. In the Hughes Tool Company case the 
foreign money was payable abroad in the country where it was cur-
rent. In both, damages for the depreciation after default in terms 
of dollars were held equally recoverable. The fact that in the lat-
ter the depreciated money was the national currency of the place 
of payment was irrelevant. Both were decided under our doc-
trine of consequential damages.107 If the facts assumed by the 
courts were correct the results were certainly "just." 
In both of these cases the breach was complete. The compen-
sation was, therefore, included in the dollar award computed at 
the breach-day rate of the foreign money of contract. In the Rich-
ar_d case payment was actually made. The credit was opened in 
lei that have depreciated after default. In this situation an in-
dependent claim for the consequential damages was held to have 
survived the belated payment.108 
Three of the foregoing cases were decided by New York State 
courts. The Hicks case was decided by the United States Supreme 
of said country. Under the facts of the case the same conclusion with respect to the 
problem now under discussion would have to be reached under our law). See also Sirie 
v. Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N.Y.S. 52 (1921); Matter of King, 129 Misc. 244, 221 
N.Y.S. 730 at 732 (1927); Paris v. Central Chiclera, (5th Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 960. It 
is particularly on this ground that such windfall awards in Comptoir Commercial 
D'lmportation v. Zabriski, mentioned in note 43 supra, are subject to serious criticism. 
10a See Part II-A, supra. 
104 269 U.S. 71, 46 S.Ct. 46 (1925). 
100 279 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 383 (1952), affd. 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E. (2d) 
884 (1953). 
106 The former because of the place of payment in this country; the latter (apparently) 
in accordance with a contrary, and more correct, conflict of law theory that the obligation 
is governed by the proper law of contract. See note 51 supra. 
107 With respect to Hicks v. Guinness, see this section, supra; with respect to Hughes 
Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., see note 76 supra. 
108 See note 139 infra. 
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Court. At least with respect to cases decided under our substan-
tive law there does not appear to be any justification for the 
view that different rules have prevailed in federal and state 
courts.109 
It may now be seen that the defect of the mechanical two-rule 
doctrine lay to a large extent in its oversimplification of the 
doctrine of consequential damages.110 
Instead of examining whether the lo~s, if any, was the natural 
result of the breach or whether it was within the contemplation of 
the parties, the mechanical criterion was based solely on whether 
the obligation was payable in the national currency of the place 
of payment.111 Where this was the case damages were conclusively 
presumed not to have been within the contemplation of the · 
parties. Where it was not, damages were conclusively presumed 
to have been intended. The fallacy of this view has been already 
explained and will be considered further.11 2 
D. Money of Damages 
Before examining the question as of what time the damages 
for depreciation of a foreign money after maturity are to be meas-
ured it must be ascertained in what currency the computation is 
to take place.113 
1. The mechanical rules developed in this country assumed 
erroneously that damages for depreciation of foreign money were 
to be measured in the currency of the place of. payment.114 It 
was said that the loss sustained by a Russian creditor from defend-
ant's failure to pay a sum of francs in London was to be measured 
109 See Part IV·E infra. To the same effect, although somewhat more cautiously, 
see opinion of Justic.e Van Voorhis in Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., cited in 
note 77 supra; the New York State cases cited in note 49 supra, following what was believed 
to be the rule enunciated by the United States Supreme Court; and the analysis of the 
Parker and Dougherty cases in note 48 supra. This and the following analysis show that 
the view, that different rules had been adopted by federal and New York State courts, 
expressed by numerous writers [see 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §1410A (1937); 
McCoRMICK, DAMAGES 190 (1935); MANN, note 8 supra, at 312, 313; NUSSBAUM, note 22 
supra, at 366, 367, 373; CoNFLicr oF LAws REsrATEMENT, New York Annotations §424 
(1935)] is not substantiated. 
110 Note 77 supra. 
111 Note 51 supra. 
112 Part ill·D infra. 
11s The importance of a proper determination of the money of damages was explained 
in Part I supra. 
114 See Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37 at 39, 138 N.E. 497 (1923), and 
its interpretation in Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), 241 N.Y. 163 at 166, 
167, 149 N.E. 338 {1925); CoNFLicr OF LAws REsrATEMENT §423 (1934); BEALE, note 22 
supra, §423.1. With respect to English law see Part IV-C infra. 
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in pounds sterling.115 Depending on whether such a conversion 
was contemplated and a loss was actually sustained this may or 
may not have yielded a just result. 
In· Richard v. American Union Bank (first case)116 this mis-
taken doctrine would have deprived an American creditor of any 
compensation for the loss actually sustained by him in dollars 
where Roumanian money, the lei, payable in said country had 
depreciated after a default in payment. The court found that an 
attempt "to prove that there was a decline in the 'market value' 
of lei in a country where lei were the national currency and the 
standard by which to determine values in damages . . . is 
impossible of achievement."117 In fact, had plaintiff intended to 
use the lei in Roumania, as originally assumed by the court, the 
result may have been proper. He may not have sustained any 
loss as a result of their depreciation in terms of dollars. In Rou-
mania the value of the lei may have remained unchanged. 
When it was alleged in a subsequent case, based on the same 
breach, that the lei to be delivered in Roumania had been pur-
chased for resale in New York for dollars and that the loss had 
actually been sustained in American money, the same court in 
fact repudiated the erroneous rule. It recognized that where the 
resale fo:r: dollars was within the contemplation of the parties the 
loss was recoverable in American money_118 
This is in accordance with the general rule explained further 
below that such damages are to be measured in the currency in 
which the loss was actually sustained, provided this was within the 
contemplation of the parties_l19 
2. Another opinion expressed sometimes, that in our courts 
such damages were always to be measured in dollars,120 is equally 
115 Cases cited in the preceding note. 
116 241 N.Y. 163, 149 N,E. 338 (1925). 
1111<1. at p. 167. 
118 Richard v. American Union Bank (2d case), 253 N.Y. 166 at 175, 170 N.E. 532 
(1930) . 
.119 Part lli-D (3) infra. 
120 Guinness v. Miller, (D.C. N.Y. 1923) 291 F. 769 at '170 (later decided in the U.S. 
Supreme Court and reported as Hicks v. Guinness, in note 84 supra). In this lower court 
decision Judge Learned Hand states that, apart from specific performance, obligations 
must be discharged in the money of the forum, no other being available, and that "the 
obligation so created can only be measured in that medium." Italics added. See also 
Petkus v. Lietuvos Ukio Bankas, · 123 Misc. 193, 204 N.Y.S. 726 at 729 (1924). These 
cases fail to distinguish between substantive and procedural conversions (see E and F 
infra); and, at least with respect to the problem now under discussion, between the 
"creation" of the right duty relationship and its "enforcement." [On this subject see 
COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAws 39 (1942); and Part IV-A infra]. 
Compare also Guinness v. Miller, supra, with Booth & Co., Inc. v. Canadian Govern-
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erroneous. It was recognized in a great many cases that damages 
and other obligations may have to be measured in foreign 
money.121 Moreover, it became one of the principles of our law 
that by merely instituting an action in this jurisdiction the foreign 
obligation is neither enlarged nor transformed into a domestic 
money obligation.122 
The proper determination of the currency in which such 
losses are to be measured has become particularly important in our 
modern era. At present most currencies are inconvertible into 
ment Merchant Marine, Ltd., (2d Cir. 1933) 63 F. (2d) 240 (recognizing defendant's 
right to discharge an obligation in pounds sterling); and with English Transcontinental, 
Ltd. v. Puebla Tramway, Light & Power Co., 186 Misc. 481, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 356 (1946), 
holding that the underlying obligation was not measured in the money of the United 
States. See also cases cited in note 121 infra. The decision in Guinness v. Miller assumes 
further quite generally that damages for torts committed within a jurisdiction are always 
to be measured in its national currency, and that the courts of all countries are required 
to express judgments in the money of the forum. With respect to the fallacies of the 
former assumption see Part III-D (3) infra; with respect to the latter, see note 8 supra. 
However, this does not necessarily affect Judge Learned Hand's more general statement 
that "no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign," frequently cited in 
support of the "local law" theory of conflict of laws, or of the "homologous right theory," 
as distinguished by Professor Cavers in "The Two 'Local Law' Theories," 63 HAR.v. L. 
R.Ev. 822 at 832 (1950). 
121 Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 
952 (pounds sterling); Paris v. Central Chiclera, (5th Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 960 (Mexican 
currency); The Vaughan and Telegraph, 14 Wall. (81 U.S.) 258 (1871) (Canadian dol-
lars); Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), cited in note 81 supra (Roumanian 
lei); Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 47 S.Ct. 166 (1926) 
(German marks); Matter of King, 129 Misc. 244, 221 N.Y.S. 730 (1927) (French francs); 
Transamerica General Corp. v. Zunino, 82 N.Y.S. (2d) 595 (1948) (Italian lire); Perutz 
v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 279 App. Div. 386, ll0 N.Y.S. (2d) 446 
(1952), revd. 304 N.Y. 533, llO N.E. (2d) 6 (Czechoslovak crowns); Sulyok v. Penzintezeti 
Kozpont Budapest, 279 App. Div. 528 at 533, 539, Ill N.Y.S. (2d) 75 (1952), affd. as 
mod. in other respects 304 N.Y. 704, 107 N.E. (2d) 604 (1952) (Hungarian forints). With 
respect to English decisions (holding that damages for depreciation of foreign money 
were not recoverable), see Celia v. Volturno, [1921] 2 A.C. 544 at 558, per Lord Sum-
ner, stating that "the claimant's right is exclusively a right to lire, and would result in a 
judgment for lire, if only an English Court was, so to speak, competent to express itself 
in Italian." In the same decision Lord Sumner points out (p. 554) that "the cost of tem-
porary repairs incurred at Gibraltar would, I suppose, have been proved in sterling; 
if they had been done at Marseilles or Cadiz, they would have been proved in francs 
or in pesetas; just as the repairs at Newport News would have been proved in dol-
lars .•.• " See also MANN, note 8 supra, at 209-2ll. 
122 Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 at 519, 47 S.Ct. 166 
(1926), stating that "the obligation is not enlarged by the fact that the creditor hap-
pens to be able to catch his debtor here," cited with approval in Dougherty v. Equitable 
Life Assurance Society, 266 N.Y. 71 at 80, 81, 193 N.E. 897 (1934). To the same effect, 
Sirie v. Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N.Y.S. 52 at 57 (1921); Transamerica General 
Corp. v. Zunino, 82 N.Y.S. (2d) 595 at 602 (1948), reading in part as follows: "I find 
nothing in those cases, or in any others, however, which intimates that a creditor who 
is entitled to a designated number of units of any foreign currency becomes entitled 
to any designated number of United States dollars merely because he brings an action 
in the United States." On this problem see also Part III-F infra. 
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gold.123 A great many of them are not freely exchangeable for 
other currencies, or transferable to foreign countries, or (with 
respect to so-called blocked accounts) even within the boundaries 
of the country where current.124 
Even where exchangeable into other currencies their value is 
often arbitrarily fixed by a single or multiple rate of exchange.125 
Consequently the substitution of a so-called "hard currency" (such 
as dollars) for a "soft currency," or vice versa, may substantially 
affect the quantum of the obligation.126 
All these facts are to be considered in order to prevent placing 
the injured party in a better or worse position than he would 
have been in, if there had been no breach or wrong.127 Where 
the law of damages comes into play it must be borne in mind that 
its general purpose is to give compensation.128 
3. It should be noted that the question of determination of the 
currency in which the loss should be measured is not a peculiarity 
arising only in connection with damages for the depreciation of 
foreign money after maturity. In fact, it is one of the neglected 
general problems of the law of damages.129 
123 HALM, MONETARY THEORY, 2d ed., 207 (1946); BEYEN, MONEY IN THE MAELSTROM 
37-39 (1949); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 55 S.Ct. 428 (1935); Perry v. United 
States, 294 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct., 432 (1935). 
124 See Survey in Part II of "Sixth Annual Report, Exchange Restrictions" (1955) 
of International Monetary Fund; Landau v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 T.C. 
12 (1946); Marache v. Ashton, [1943] A.C. 311; Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 
279 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 383 (1952), affd. 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E. (2d) 884 (1953). 
125 On the discrepancy between the so-called "official" and "free market" rates of 
exchange see note 124 supra; and PICK, BLACK MARKET YEARBOOK (1954); KENT, note 
23 supra, at 547, 575-577; KRIZ, THE PRICE OF GoLD, Princeton Univ., Essays in Inter-
national Finance No. 15, p. 4 (1952). 
126 See Part I supra. It is only surprising that in the early post World ·war I era, 
as long as New York law favored the single breach-day rule (see Part II-B, supra), 
foreign creditors did not flood our courts with their foreign causes of action, whenever 
the defendant had assets in this country, in order to cash in on the windfall profits. [See, 
e.g., Comptoir Commercial D'Importation v. Zabriskie, 127 Misc. 461, 216 N.Y.S. 473 
(1926), mentioned in note 9 supra.] To some extent a foreign creditor's position may 
be improved even under the present state of our law. Under our procedural conversion 
rule a judgment based on a soft currency obligation must be expressed in dollars, one 
of the hardest currencies, at the judgment-day rate of exchange. Unfortunately, this can-
not be avoided as long as the statutory provisions mentioned in Part I supra remain 
unchanged. 
127 See Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 
383 at 385 (1952), affd. without op. 304 N.Y. 942, 110 N.E. (2d) 884 (1953), in which 
the court held that foreign monies which would have been blocked in the foreign place 
of payment are to be converted into dollars at the lower "free market" rate of exchange, 
rather than at the "official rate of exchange," because "these parties did not intend that 
defendant should solve plaintiff's foreign exchange difficulties." 
128 McCORMICK, note 74 supra, at 560. See also notes 74, 75 and 80 supra. 
120 See authorities cited in notes 130-133 infra. 
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From such a general point of view Professor Nussbaum refers 
to the currency in which damages in contracts and, torts are to 
be computed as "money of damages."130 This terminology appears 
to be very appropriate. He suggests that its determination con-
stitutes a question of fact and that comparatively the best standard 
for its determination seems to be the currency of the damaged 
party's place of business or domicile.131 
Dr. Mann132 and Dicey's Conflict of Laws,133 although in agree-
ment that the problem raises a question of fact, tried to narrow 
its scope. Dr. Mann points out that although no general principle 
may be laid down with safety, "the liability is expressed in that 
money which is eventually employed by the injured party and to 
which the damage is thus finally traced back."134 According to 
Dicey's Conflict of Laws, it appears that "where English law is 
the proper law of a contract, damages for its breach must be 
assessed in the currency in which the loss was incurred, unless a 
contrary intention emerges from the contract itself."135 
The basic proposition, that the determination of the currency 
in which the loss was sustained raises a question of fact, appears 
to be only one part of the general rule. By itself it does not 
answer the question of the recoverability of such loss. It is here 
that the doctrine of consequential damages comes into play. Was 
the currency in which the loss had actually been sustained within 
the contemplation of the parties? If it was, it must be measured 
in such a currency. If it was not, the loss may be too remote.136 
A limitation of the first part of the general principle suggested 
by the above writers, based on the domicile of the creditor, or 
the currency in which the loss was sustained, or even the place of 
performance, may frequently give the correct answer. However, 
it fails to define the complete general rule. As it appears from this 
analysis, the damages, if recoverable, are to be measured in the 
money in which the loss was actually sustained, provided such loss 
130 NussBAUM, note 22 supra, at 404, by analogy with "money of contract" in which 
the quantum of the obligation was measured. 
131 Id. at 405. 
132 MANN, note 8 supra, at 204-211. 
133 DICEY, note 64 supra, Rule 163. 
134 MANN, note 8 supra, at 209. 
135 Note 64 supra, at 734. However, Rule 163 is preceded by a caveat ("semble"). 
It should be noted that the statement constitutes the general rule, without any particular 
reference to damages for depreciation of foreign money. According to Rule 160 of said 
work such daniages are not recoverable under English law (Part II-D supra). 
136 Richard v. American Union Bank, both cases; and Hughes Tool Co. v. United 
Artists Corp., all cited in note 74 supra. See also the conclusions reached in 65 HARv. 
L. REV. 887 at 889 (1952). 
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was either the natural result of the breach, or was within the con-
templation of the parties.137 The correct answer will be obtained 
once more by merely continuing the process of considering the 
problem under the doctrine of consequential damages. 
E. Substantive Conversions 
The most important characteristic of these valuations, based 
on the controlling law of damages, is that they determine not only 
the quantum, but may also affect the very nature of the new, 
secondary obligation. The primary obligation may be transformed 
into a secondary obligation expressed in a different currency 
(substantive conversion), irrespective of whether litigation will 
ensue.138 In certain instances "payment" of the original sum in 
depreciated money, even if accepted, may not fully discharge the 
obligation.139 
This may lead to three different situations: 
1. The loss may have been sustained in the same currency, 
foreign to the forum, in which the original obligation had been 
expressed. Usually no damages will be recoverable,140 except 
where permissible by special provisions of a controlling foreign 
137 Cases cited in the preceding note. 
138See opinion of Justice Holmes in Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 at 80, 46 S.Ct. 46 
(1925), pointing out that when the contract was broken the creditor may have refused 
to accept the stipulated amount of marks having become entitled to a sum of dollars 
by operation of law (see passage quoted in note 88 supra). Professor Nussbaum (note 
22 supra, at 372) argues that the theory advanced by Justice Holmes, "that the amount 
of foreign currency, if payable in the United States, is ipso facto transformed into a dollar 
amount" is untenable. He seems to overlook, however, that there was no "ipso facto" 
transformation just because the obligation was payable in the United States. The decision 
was based on the doctrine of consequential damages. The conversion was not procedural 
but substantive. The problem involved the determination of the "money of damages" 
and of its quantum. The place of performance was merely one of the elements to be con-
sidered. Coupled with the nationality of the creditor it appears to have convinced the 
court that the loss in dollars had been the natural and foreseeable result of the breach. 
139 See Richard v. American Union Bank (2d case), 253 N.Y. 166 at 174, 170 N.E. 
532 (1930), holding that, although payment in depreciated money had been accepted, 
the injured party "may still retain his right of action for damages caused by delay. (Pers. 
Prop. Law [Cons. Laws, ch. 41], §130)." See also dictum in Guinness v. Miller, (D.C. N.Y. 
1923) 291 F. 769 at 771; and note 148 infra. Although an independent claim for damages 
may survive "payment" in depreciated money, such damages are most frequently (almost 
automatically) included in the result obtained by a correct selection of the conversion 
date. See Hicks v. Guinness, cited in note 138; Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 
cited in note 127 supra; and B, F, and G (2) (a) of this part. 
140 This was believed to be the situation in the first Richard case cited in note 81 
supra; Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, cited in note 122 supra; Sirie v. 
Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N.Y.S. 52 at 57 (1921); and in the judgment-day cases 
cited in note 58 supra. 
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law.141 (E.g.: Original obligation expressed in Italian money 
payable in Italy to an Italian creditor. No damages in any other 
currency were contemplated. Loss sustained in Italian money. 
Action instituted in an American court.) 
No substantive conversion into another currency comes into 
effect. If the controlling law permits such damages, they will be 
either included in the ultimate obligation or constitute a new 
independent obligation in the same currency.142 Although this 
may affect the quantum of the secondary obligation it still remains 
to be expressed in the original currency. 
2. In the second situation the loss may have been sustained 
in a currency different from that in which the original obligation 
was expressed, both of which may be foreign to the forum. (E.g.: 
Original obligation expressed in French francs. Recoverable loss 
sustained in pounds sterling. Action instituted in an American 
court.) Here the original franc obligation is transformed into 
an ultimate (secondary) sterling obligation.143 According to the 
principles explained further below, this substantive conversion 
of the francs into pounds sterling is to be effected as of the day on 
which it had been contemplated that the creditor would have 
converted the French money into English money had timely 
payment been made.144 Consequently the ultimate sterling amount 
will include damages. 
3. In the third situation the loss from depreciation of a cur-
rency foreign to the forum may have been sustained in a currency 
which happens to be the national currency of the forum, into which 
the creditor may have intended to convert the original foreign 
money had timely payment been made.146 (E.g.: Original obliga-
141 Transamerica General Corp. v. Zunino, 82 N.Y.S. (2d) 595 at 604, 605 (1948), 
in which the court considered whether under art. 1224 of the Italian Civil Code of 1942 
damages were recoverable for depreciation of Italian money payable in Italy to an Italian 
creditor. 
H2 See the Zunino case, cited in the preceding note, at 605; Dach, "Conversion of 
Foreign Money," 3 AM. J. COMP. LAw 156 at 162, 167, 170-171 (1954); MANN, note 8 supra, 
at 330, 331; and note 139 supra. 
143 Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37 at 39, 138 N.E. 497 (1923), as interpreted 
in Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), 241 N.Y. 163 at 166, 167, 149 N.E. 338 
(1925). With respect to the erroneous assumption expressed in these two cases that the 
damages are to be measured in the currency of the place of performance, as a general 
rule, see criticism in note 51, and in Part 111-D (1) supra. 
144 Part ID·G infra. With respect to the additional procedural conversion of the 
pounds sterling into dollars, in which the judgment must be expressed in an American 
court, see Part III-F infra. 
145 Hicks v. Guinness, note 138 supra; and Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 
note 127 supra. 
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tion expressed in German money. Recoverable loss sustained in 
United States dollars. Action instituted in an American court.) 
Here again, for the reasons explained in the preceding subsection 
the original foreign money obligation is transformed into an 
ultimate, secondary dollar obligation in which damages are in-
cluded (substantive conversion). Nothing else but the full pay-
ment thereof will discharge this secondary obligation. Except for 
interest and costs its quantum and nature remain unaffected by 
the institution of an action. The judgment award will be identical 
with the ultimate secondary obligation. 
F. Procedural Conversions 
Similarly, were it not for our procedural rule preventing our 
courts from rendering judgments in foreign money, the judgment 
award would be for the ultimate amount of lire in the first, and 
for sterling in the second situation mentioned in the preceding 
section. 
However, in view of our procedural rule requiring judgments 
to be expressed in our national currency, unless prior payment 
is made, a substantially and different conversion-valuation comes 
into play. By reason of this rule of the lex fori the court must fix 
the exact dollar equivalent of the ultimate foreign money obliga-
tion (procedural conversion).146 
No such conversion is required until the very time of judgment. 
Until such time, except for interest and costs, the obligation may 
be discharged by payment of the numerical amount of the ulti-
mate obligation, whatever it may be.147 Being unable to grant 
relief for the identical sum the court's award must be almost 
identical. No correct equivalent in the money of the forum will 
be obtained, unless this procedural conversion is effected as of 
the time of judgment (and for practical reasons, as of the time 
of trial).148 
The foregoing analysis shows that where damages for deprecia-
tion of foreign money after default are recoverable they are in-
cluded in the ultimate amount or constitute an independent 
146 See note 8 supra, and Part IV-A and C infra. The term "proc.edural conversion" 
was used in a different sense by Professor Drake in 28 MICH. L. R.Ev. 229 at 230, 231, 241 
(1930). Professor Nussbaum (note 22 supra, at 364 ff.) refers to conversions of this type 
as "compulsory judicial conversions." 
147 Cases cited in notes 121, 140 supra, and Part IV-A and C infra. 
148 Ibid. 29 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1948) §27, providing that the computation 
of the dollar equivalent in which judgments or decrees are to be rendered should be "as 
near as may be, in dollars and cents, rejecting lesser fractions." 
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obligation. They come into existence by operation of the con-
trolling substantive law. On the other hand the procedural con-
version is based on the lex fori. To effect the procedural con-
version of any other day than that of judgment (trial) would 
amount either to awarding damages where none are recoverable, 
or to giving double indemnity where damages had already been 
awarded by the preceding substantive conversion. 
The procedural conversion is not devised to affect the quantum 
of the recovery. Its sole purpose is to fix the equivalent of the 
ultimate obligation in terms of the money of the forum.149 It 
follows that all procedural conversions are to be effected at the 
judgment (trial)-day rate of exchange. 
G. The Conversion Date 
I. It remains to be considered as of what time substantive 
conversions are to be effected under our law. One general prin-
ciple common to all types of conversions (valuations), whether 
substantive or procedural, may be derived from the subsequent 
analysis. All are to be effected as of the time when the necessity 
thereof had first arisen. The various types of conversion differ, 
however, with respect to the question of when such necessity arises. 
In spite of the apparent obviousness of this general principle, 
it frequently remained unnoticed.150 If strictly adhered to, it 
would have prevented procedural conversions as of any other 
than judgment (trial)-day. No necessity of such conversions 
arises until that very date.151 
149 Vvith respect to certain unfortunate consequences resulting from procedural con-
version of soft currency claims into dollar obligations as of the time of judgment, see 
last part of not!! 126, and Part I supra. The convertibility and transferability of the 
currency involved may -affect the kind of rate of exchange to be applied. This question 
and, more particularly, whether the so-called "official" or the "free market" rate of ex-
change is proper in a given situation exceeds the scope of this paper and requires a sep• 
arate analysis. The procedural conversion is controlled by the lex fori. See Part IV-C 
infra. 
150 It is in this respect that the decision in Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The 
Fredericksburg, (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 952, may be justly criticized, insofar as it dis-
regards that a part-payment in dollars, made on account of a sterling obligation before 
the devaluation of the pound, is to be converted into pounds at the payment-day, when 
the necessity of a conversion has arisen, rather than at the post-devaluation judgment-
day rate of exchange. Two types of conversions were required in this case. A sub-
stantive conversion of the part-payment in dollars (money of payment) into pounds 
(money of damages), to be effected at the payment-day rate; and a procedural conversion 
of the remaining balance of English money into dollars to be effected at the judgment-
day rate. The conversion of the entire original sterling obligation into dollars at the 
post-devaluation judgment-day rate, disregarding that a part payment in dollars had 
been made before the devaluation of the sterling, may have given the injured party 
about .£10,000 less than the amount of the loss sustained by plaintiff in English money. 
151 See Part III-F supra. 
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With respect to substantive conversions the answer to the 
question of when such necessity had first arisen is not so uniform. 
It depends on the purpose for which the measurement is required. 
An agreement may permit or even require the discharge of a 
foreign money obligation (money of account, money of contract) 
by payment in a different currency (money of payment).152 The 
time as of which the valuation is to be effected may or may not 
have been fixed by the parties. 
In other instances payment in a different currency may be 
permissible under the so-called local payment rule allowing the 
discharge of all monetary obligations (with certain exceptions) 
by payment of any money that is legal tender at the place of pay-
ment.153 Where the time was not fixed by agreement the con-
trolling substantive law will determine the date as of which the 
valuation should be made.154 Under our law, in the absence of 
the question of damages or of other special provisions of the con-
trolling law, the measurement is to be effected at the rate of 
exchange prevailing on the day of actual payment.155 It is as of this 
day that the necessity thereof had first arisen. No other computa-
tion renders a correct equivalent. 
Similarly, in view of the usual rule "that the right of an ex-
ecutor to set off ~ebts owing by legatees is fixed at the time of 
death" a mark indebtedness of a German legatee of an American 
152 Booth &: Co. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine, Ltd., (2d Cir. 1933) 63 
F. (2d) 240; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Cameron, 280 Pa. 458, 124 A. 638 (1924). 
153 NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, at 360, 361; DICEY, note 64 supra, Rule 164; MANN, 
note 8 supra, at 282-285; Proposed Uniform Commercial Code-commercial Papers 
(Official Draft, 1952 Te.xt and Comment ed.) § 3-107 (2). 
154 The controversial conflict of laws problem of determination of the law governing 
the quantum of the obligation exceeds the scope of this paper. (See note 51 supra, and 
Part IV-A and C infra.) Another difficulty may arise from the uncertainty of the 
· borderline between matters of substance and mere details of performance. The latter are 
governed by the law of the place of performance (see 2 BEALE, note 22 supra, § 361.2, 
p. 1268). As long as both, the money of account and the money of payment, are freely 
convertible into gold and freely exchangeable and transferable the discharge of the 
obligation in the local currency of the place of payment appears to be such a detail. 
However, the substitution of a "hard" and freely exchangeable currency for a "soft" 
nonexchangeable money "in · obligatione" or vice versa may affect the very substance. 
(See Part I-B, and note 126 supra.) It is in this light that the conflict of laws rules 
should be carefully applied to modern monetary problems. 
155 Booth &: Co. v. Canadian Merchant Marine, Ltd., (2d Cir. 1933) 63 F. (2d) 240 at 
241 (as no foreign law was pleaded the problem appears to have been either held to be 
controlled by the New York law or the foreign law seems to have been deemed to be 
identical with ours). The same conclusion follows from the underlying principles of 
the judgment-day rule. See Part III-F supra, and the judgment-day cases cited in note 
58 supra. 
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testator to be applied against the former's share was valued as 
of said time.1116 
The date as of which such necessity actually arises was also 
suggested where both the money of account and the money of pay-
ment are fixed by contract but where an item expressed in a 
different currency is to be taken into consideration. (E.g.: Limits 
of coverage by insurance measured in currency A, compensation 
payable in currency B, loss sustained in currency C.)1117 
Under the law of negotiable instruments the date of conversion 
may be fixed by the doctrine of re-exchange. The amount of 
money of a foreign place of payment may have to be converted 
into the currency of the country where the dishonored bill was 
drawn at the rate of exchange prevailing on the day of dishonor.1118 
Here the date as of which the necessity of conversion had first 
arisen was fixed by a specific rule. 
2. The problem becomes more difficult where the substantive 
conversion is based on the law of damages. Here the time as of 
which the valuation is to be effected fluctuates. 
In this determination of the quantum of the new, different 
and hitherto unliquidated secondary obligation (as distinguished 
from the equivalent of the original, primary obligation)1119 the 
underlying principles of the doctrine of consequential damages 
will again prove to be useful. The injured party is to be placed 
in the same position as if there had been no breach or wrong, 
provided this was within the contemplation of the parties.160 
(a) The situation where the stipulated foreign currency 
(money of account, money of contract) depreciated in terms of 
another currency after default will be considered first.161 
Where the stipulated foreign money had been intended to be 
converted into such other currency immediately upon payment, 
156 Matter of Heck, 203 Misc. 788, 116 N.Y.S. (2d) 255 at 258, 259 (1952). On this 
case see note 75 supra. 
157 MANN, note 8 supra, at 290, 291. 
lllS Pavenstedt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 203 N.Y. 91 at 95, 96 N.E. 104 (1911); 
Gross v. Mendel, 171 App. Div. 237, 157 N.Y.S. 357 (1916), affd. 225 N.Y. 633, 121 N.E. 
871 (1918), as interpreted in Sirie v. Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N.Y.S. 52 at 57 
(1921); Simonoff v. Granite City Nat. Bank, 279 Ill. 248, 116 N.E. 663 (1917); Furness, 
Withy 8: Co. v. Rothe, (4th Cir. 1923) 286 F. 870. With respect to the conversion of 
foreign money into pounds sterling under §72, subs. 4 of the English Bill of Exchange 
Act, 46 Viet., c. 6 (1882), see note 232 infra. 
159 See Part III-E infra. 
160 See Part III-C and D supra. 
161 This was the situation in most of the earlier English and American breach-day 
cases. See Part II-B supra. 
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nothing else than a breach (maturity)-day conversion will make 
reparation.162 
It is of this time that the necessity of conversion had first 
arisen and is therefore to be effected. Furthermore, in view of 
the general rule of the law of damages that in the absence of special 
circumstances the valuation is to be effected as of the time of 
breach,163 there even seems to be a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of such a valuation, provided the damages are recoverable 
at all.164 
(b) A different situation arises where the foreign money 
appreciates after the breach or wrong. Here the breach-day valua-
tion may not afford adequate relief to the injured party. Where 
the currency was acquired as a "commodity" (sale of exchange) it 
appears that in accordance with the doctrine of Baker v. Drake165 
and Wright v. Bank of the Metropolis166 the valuation is to be 
effected as of a later date, after plaintiff learned of the loss and 
was in a position to replace it.167 It appears that the injured party 
is required to mitigate the loss. He is expected to "cover" himself 
by purchase or sale of the stipulated currency in order to prevent 
the loss from increasing.168 No damages may be required for 
depreciation after the day when the replacement of the loss became 
possible. 
(c) However, where the underlying transaction was a foreign 
currency debt (rather than a sale of exchange) the requirement 
of mitigation of damages does not seem to come into play. Al-
though this is not clearly settled, it appears that no "cover" is 
required where the foreign currency functions as money (as dis-
162 Hicks v. Guinness, cited in note 138 supra; Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists 
Corp., cited in note 127 supra. 
163 I SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, 9th ed., §243, pp. 491, 492 (1912); McCORMICK, note 74 
supra, §48, pp. 183-189; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1381 (1937); TORTS REsrATEMENT 
§927 (1939); and id., §9Il, comment, subdiv. K, p. 573 (according to which plaintiff 
may have an election with respect to time); 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1948) 
§148 (3); Uniform Sales Act §67. 
164 Where such damages are recoverable the foreign currency is treated to some extent 
as a commodity for this limited purpose. Where no damages are recoverable the valua-
tion is to be effected as of the actual payment-day; and if no prior payment was made, as 
of the judgment (trial) date. 
165 53 N.Y. 2Il, 13 Am. Rep. 507 (1873). 
166 llO N.Y. 237 at 249, 18 N.E. 79 (1888). On the widespread adoption of these 
principles by the majority of the American states and the different position of the 
English law, see McCORMICK, note 74 supra at 183-189, but, with regard to England, see 
MANN, note 8 supra, at 97, and the cases there cited. 
167 McCORMICK, note 74 supra, at 187; 2 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, 9th ed., c. XXII (1912)'. 
168 NussBAUM, note 22 supra, at 324, 344; Rifkind in 26 CoL. L. R.Ev. 559 at 567 
(1926); but see Part I supra. 
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tinguished from a commodity). This is particularly so where the 
innocent party had already parted with the consideration ( quid) 
in return for which the promise of payment had been made.169 
Consequently, there may be instances where, in accordance 
with the doctrine of consequential damages, the valuation may 
have to be effected at a higher, or depending on the facts of the 
case, even the highest intermediate rate between breach and judg-
ment-day. 
It is, however, more likely that where the foreign currency 
functioning in the underlying transaction (acquisition) as money 
appreciates after default the injured party may elect to proceed in 
debt, rather than for damages for breach of contract.17° This 
will permit him to avoid any loss resulting from the depreciation 
of his own national currency or of any other money than that in 
which the obligation had been expressed.171 
H. Actions in Debt and Breach of Contract Distinguished 
The distinction between actions in debt and for damages for 
breach of contract has been examined in numerous decisions both 
in this country and in England.172 With respect to our domestic 
money obligations the distinction is obscured by the various func-
tions of money and the rigidity of the nominalistic principle.173 
109 lbid. See also Part lll-H infra. 
170 With respect to the election see Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 at 80, 46 S.Ct. 46 
(1925), passage quoted in note 88 supra, and Part III-H infra. 
171 He must then receive either the originally stipulated amount of foreign money, 
or its equivalent in the money of payment at the actual payment-day rate of exchange; 
or, where no such prior payment is made, the award in dollars (money of the forum) 
must be effected at the (trial) judgment-day rate of exchange. 
112 Hicks v. Guinness, note 170 supra; Richard v. American Union Bank (1st case), 
241 N.Y. 163 at 171, 149 N.E. 338 (1925) (dissenting opinion of Judge Lehman); Parker 
v. Hoppe, 258 N.Y. 365 at 367, 179 N.E. 770 (1932) (see note 48 supra). See also 
Matter of King, 129 Misc. 244, 221 N.Y.S. 730 at 732, 733 (1927); and the authorities 
cited therein, examining the distinction between action for breach of contract and 
action on the contract. In England the problem was examined in Societe des Hotels 
Le Touquet Paris-Plage v. Cummings, [1922] 1 K.B. 451 at 457, per Bankes, L.J., 463-
464, per Atkin, L. J.; In re Chesterman's Trusts, [1923] 2 Ch. 466 at 479, per Lord 
Stemdale, M.R., and at 485, per Warrington, L.J.; In re British American Continental 
Bank-Goldzieher &: Penso's Claim, [1922] 2 Ch. 575; same-In re Lisser &: Rosenkranz's 
Claim, [1923] 1 Ch. 276 at 284, 291; New Brunswick Railway Co. v. British and French 
Trust Corp., [1939] A.C. 1 at 29, per Lord Russell of Killowen; Grauman v. Treitel, 
[1940] 2 All E.R. 188; Vionnet v. Wills, [1939] 4 All E.R. 136 at 138, per Clauson, L. J.; 
Cummings v. London Bullion Co., [1952] 1 All E.R. 383 at 384, 385; DICEY, note 64 supra, 
at 748, 749; MANN, note 8 supra at 62, 63, 152, 330. 
173 BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY (3d rev. 1914) p. 752, points out: "whether when the 
law gives judgment on a contract to pay money-e.g. on a promissory note-this is to be 
regarded as enforcing performance of the promise, or as awarding damages for the 
breach of it, is a question on which jurisconsults have differed." See also 1 CLARK, 
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As far as domestic money obligations are concerned the cur-
rency stipulated as the medium of exchange (money) is assumed 
by law to be identical in its nature and value with the currency 
which by operation of law is the general subsidiary means of dis-
charge of all obligations (money).174 Therefore, it becomes ir-
relevant whether it is the primary or the secondary obligation 
which is being enforced, or whether, in fact, there is any such 
distinction at all. 
In England the distinction has been held to be irrelevant even 
with respect to foreign money obligations.175 As long as the 
English law does not permit damages for depreciation of foreign 
currencies,176 the primary (debt) and the secondary obligation 
(debt plus nominal damages) are deemed to be identical. 
However, as far as foreign money obligations are concerned 
the situation is different under our law. Depending on the con-
templation of the parties and the facts of the case, a new and dif-
ferent secondary obligation may come into existence as a result 
of the breach.177 The question now is whether this transformation 
is absolute or whether it comes into effect only if the injured party 
elects to claim it (option). 
In this respect it should be considered that the parties usually 
intend to protect the creditor against depreciation of the stipulated 
foreign money of contract after maturity. It is this foreign money 
which primarily determines the quantum of the obligation. The 
parties are not assumed to have intended to reduce the obligation 
if the creditor's own national currency should depreciate in terms 
of the stipulated foreign money of contract. To do otherwise 
would amount to changing the very nature of the primary obliga-
tion, or to assuming that the parties may have contemplated giving 
the party at fault a premium for his breach.178 It becomes ir-
NEW YORK I.Aw OF DAMAGES, c. XIV, p. 333 (1925). Cf. POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
OF CONTRACTS, 3d ed., 31 (1926). 
174 See Part IV-B (I) infra. 
175 Vionnet v. Wills, [1930] 4 All E.R. 136 at 138, 139, per Clauson, L.J., pointing out 
that no distinction "can in principle be drawn between the case of a claim in respect 
of breach of contract which results in relief by way of damages and a like claim which 
results in relief by way of judgment for a fixed sum." To the same effect see Cummings 
v. London Bullion Co., [1952] I All E.R. 383 at 384, 385; and In re Russian Commercial 
and Industrial Bank, [1955] I All E.R. 75 at 77, 78. See also Part IV-C infra. 
176 See Part II-D supra. 
177 See Part III-C, D, E supra. 
178 Here the "money of damages" may resemble a currency (money of measure) by 
which the value of an obligation expressed in a different currency (money of account) 
is to be measured pursuant to a contractual valuation clause. (On the absolute or 
relative effect of fluctuation of value of the "money of measure" on the quantum of the 
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relevant that the loss from depreciation of the stipulated foreign 
money, if any, and if claimed, may have been required to be 
measured in the creditor's own national currency or another 
money. 
This shows that the principle enunciated by Justice Holmes,179 
giving the creditor an option of claiming either the debt or 
damages for the breach of contract to make payment, is well 
founded.180 It is in line with the frequently emphasized view 
that the party at fault should not be enabled to speculate181 or 
even to benefit from the breach.182 
Where the creditor elects to enforce the primary obligation, 
and proceeds on the theory of debt, a valuation of the money of 
contract in terms of another currency, if any, is to be effected at 
the rate of exchange prevailing on the day of actual payment.183 
Where no such prior payment is made the judgment (trial)-day 
rate of exchange will be applied in the procedural conversion.184 
IV. LIMITS OF THE LEx FoRI 
A. Substantive Conversions Governed by Lex Causae 
The foregoing analysis deals primarily with problems arising 
under American, and more particularly under New York law. A 
full survey of the conflict of laws aspect of this problem would 
exceed the scope of this article. However, since it was suggested 
by some writers that the question of damages for depreciation of 
obligation see MANN, note 8 supra, at 162, 163.) It was for similar reasons that a 
decision of the Highest Court of Czechoslovakia of Feb. 4, 1938, Rv. II 884/36, Official 
Reports (Vazny) 16692, held that the amount of rent in domestic money under a lease, 
containing a dollar valuation clause, was not impaired by the devaluation of the dollar 
(money of measure). The devaluation of the latter had not been within the contem-
plation of the parties. The parties intended to protect the lessor against depreciation 
of the stipulated domestic currency (money of account). 
179 See notes 88 and 138 supra. 
180 With respect to somewhat similar elections of the injured party, see TORTS 
R.EsTATEMENT, comment to §9ll, subdiv. K, p. 573 (1939); East India Trading Co. v. 
Carmel Exporters and Importers, [1952] l All E.R. 1053 at 1055 (option of conversion as 
of original breach-day or as of foreign judgment-day, under English law). See also Dr. 
Mann's comment, note 8 supra, at 275, 277, on art. 41 of the (League of Nations) 
Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and Notes, and on art. 36 of the (League of 
Nations) Uniform Law of Checks, giving the creditor an option between a breach-day 
or a payment-day valuation; and Dach, "Conversion of Foreign Money," 3 AM. J. COMP. 
LAw 155 at 177-181 (1954). 
181 See note 40 supra. 
182 See note 75 supra. 
1sasee Part m-G(l) supra. 
184 See Part III-F supra. 
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foreign money is governed by the lex fori,185 a few basic principles 
pertaining to foreign causes of action must be mentioned in order 
to prove that under our conflict law this view is untenable.186 
The error may emanate from three sources: from a failure to 
distinguish between substance and procedure, or as defined in 
another connection, from confusing "the 'creation' of the right-
duty relation with problem of its 'enforcement' ";187 from a mis-
taken view of what our public policy is on this subject;188 or from 
an unrestrained adoption of certain doctrines which seem to have 
prevailed in England.189 
As illustrated by Professor Cook, a secondary right, although 
frequently referred to as "remedial," is "as much 'substantive' as 
the primary right itself."100 This has been unmistakably recog-
nized by both the leading federal and New York State decisions, 
even with respect to damages for depreciation of foreign money.101 
185 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1005, pp. 53-55 (1951); Drake, "The Proper Rule in 
Fluctuating Exchange," 28 MICH. L. REv. 229 at 248 (1930); McCORMICK, DAMAGES §49 
(1935) (fluctuations in the value of money). With respect to English law on this sub-
ject see CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw, 3d ed., 835-858 (1947); WoLFF, PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d ed., 242-244 (1950); and Part IV-C infra. 
186 Purely procedural conversions effected by reason of a requirement of the lex fori 
that judgments are to be expressed in dollars are of course clearly distinguishable. See 
Part III-F supra, and Part IV-C infra. 
187 COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 39 (1942). 
188 See Part IV-B infra. 
189 See Part IV-C infra. 
100 Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," 42 YALE L. J. 333 
at 349 (1932); and COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws, c. 
VI, p. 172 (1942). To the same effect, see l BEALE, note 22 supra, §8A.26, pp. 83, 84; 
and 3 id., §606.l, P· 1629; 2 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 27_6, 277, 542, 543 (1947); CON· 
FLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT §§412-416 (1934); 11 AM. JUR., Conflict of Laws §134 (1937) 
(with respect to contracts); GOODRICH, THE CONFLICT OF LAws §91, p. 179 (1927); STUM• 
BERG, CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., 134, 152, 155, 160 (1951); Lorenzen, "Validity and Effects 
of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws,'' 31 YALE L. J. 53 at 72 (rule 4) (1921); NUSSBAUM, 
PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 174, 175 (1943); McCORI\IICK, note 74 supra, 
at 4, 8-10 (however, with respect to valuation of foreign money, see his views cited in 
note 185 supra). See also FALCONBRIDGE, ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., 309, 
310 (1954) (but see also id., p. 819, with respect to torts). Contra: writings cited in 
note 185 supra; and 11 A111. JUR., Conflict of Laws §186 (1937) (with respect to torts); with 
respect to English law see Part IV-C infra.· 
191 Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 at 80, 46 S.Ct. 46 (1925); Deutsche Bank Filiale 
Numberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 at 519, 47 S.Ct. 166 (1926); Zimmerman v. Suther-
land, 274 U.S. 253 at 255, 256, 47 S.Ct. 625 (1927); Transamerica General Corp. v. Zunino, 
82 N.Y.S. (2d) 595 at 604 (1948); Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 266 N.Y. 
71 at 80, 81, 193 N.E. 897 (1934); Revillon v. Demme, 114 Misc. 1, 185 N.Y.S. 443 at 
445 (1920); Sirie v. Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N.Y.S. 52 (1921); Buxhoeveden v. 
Estonian State Bank, 106 N.Y.S. (2d) 287 (1951); Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank, 279 
App. Div. 386, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 446 (1952), revd. on other grounds, 304 N.Y. 533, ll0 
N.E. (2d) 6 (1953); Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, ll0 
N.Y.S. (2d) 383 (1952), affd. without op. 304 N.Y. 942, ll0 N.E. (2d) 884 (1953) [see, 
however, Prof. Corbin's interpretation of this decision in 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1953 Supp.) 
§1005, p. 6, n. 72, in favor of the lex fori]. To the same effect, see 5 WILLISTON, CoN-
TRACTS, rev. ed., §1410A (1937); 15 AM. JUR., Damages §63 (1938); suggestion in MANN, 
supra note 8, at 330-331; notes 51 and 154 supra. 
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Although most of these decisions appear to be based on the so-
called "vested right" theory;192 the same conclusion must be 
reached under the "local law'.' theory.103 
It makes little difference whether the courts are deemed to 
enforce a foreign acquired vested right as assumed by the former, 
or whether they are deemed to have adopted "a rule of decision 
identical or at least highly similar though not identical in scope 
with a rule of decision found in the system of law in force in an-
other country with which some or all of the foreign elements are 
connected," as assumed by the latter.194 Consequently, both the 
"vested right" or the "rule of decision" will be primarily195 
determined by the controlling substantive law, applicable under 
our conflict rules, unless the provisions of the foreign law are con-
trary to our public policy. 
B. Public Policy 
The question of what our public policy is on this subject may 
be tested by the following considerations. Although the pro-
visions of the foreign law may be far more complicated, the follow-
ing two propositions are basic. It may, or may not, permit dam-
ages for depreciation of the currency involved. 
I. As far as the first proposition is concerned, it should be 
noticed that to a limited extent our own substantive law does 
permit such damages, evep. with respect to the currency of the 
foreign place of payment.196 
192 See decisions of Justice Holmes in Deutsche Bank Filiale Numberg v. Humphrey, 
and in Zimmerman v. Sutherland, both cited in the preceding note; and the analysis in 
Reiblich, "The Conflict of Laws Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes," 28.GEo. L. J. 1 at 
7-10 (1939); also Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 266 N.Y. 71 at 80, 193 N.E. 
897 (1934); and Transamerica v. Zunino, 82 N.Y.S. (2d) 595 at 602, 603 (1948). 
193 Bernstein v. Van Heygen Freres, S.A., (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 246 at 249, 
cert. den. 332 U.S. 772, 68 S.Ct. 88 (1947); COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CoNFLicr 
OF LAws, c. I, pp. 20, 21 (1942); Reiblich in 28 GEO. L. J. 1 at 14 (1939). This will 
also apply to the "homologous right theory," as distinguished by Professor Cavers in 
63 HARV. L. REv. 822 at 832 (1950). 
104 CooK, note 193 supra. Professor Cook goes even further with respect to cases 
in which, from the point of view of the foreign state, the facts are purely domestic. A 
similar conclusion follows under the "comity theory" (see Reiblich, note 192 supra). 
195.Prima facie; the somewhat ambiguous word "primarily" is used to indicate the 
sequence of the considerations involved in this process, rather than their importance. 
196 Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 
383 (1952); Richard v. American Union Bank (2d case), 253 N.Y. 166, 170 N.E. 532 
(1930); the cases l;>ased on the doctrine of re-exchange and particularly Pavenstedt v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 203 N.Y. 91, 96 N.E. 104 (1911); note 158 supra. See also Orlik 
v. Wiener Bank Verein, 204 App. Div. 432, 198 N.Y.S. 413 (1923), discussed in Part 
IV-D, and in notes 253 and 254 infra. 
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It is only with respect to our own national currency that in 
view. of the nominalistic principle and the provisions of the Joint 
Resolution of Congress of June 5, 1933197 no damages are per-
missible. This enactment forbids any freezing of the value of 
the money of the United States.198 An award of damages would 
do exactly that. 
However, this ban does not apply to obligations expressed in 
other currencies.199 Under its widest interpretation the prohibi-
tion was extended to so-called multiple currency clauses giving the 
creditor an option of demanding payment either in dollars, or 
in other stipulated currencies. This construction was based on 
the theory that there was only one basic obligation expressed in 
dollars.200 But, a multiple currency bond, in which neither the 
basic nor the optional obligations were expressed in our national 
currency, was held not to be affected by the prohibition. Neither 
the fact that in this country by qperation of law the obligation 
may be dischargeable in dollars, 201 nor the circumstance that the 
judgment must be expressed in domestic currency, appears to 
have been sufficient to vitiate the clause.202 In this instance it is 
not the value of the dollar which is measured (mensuratum). The 
dollar itself is the measure (mensura) of the value of the foreign 
currency (mensuratum).203 Under our law there is a conclusive 
197 48 Stat. L. 113, c. 48, § (a) (1933), 31 U.S.C. (1952) §463 declaring all pro-
visions purporting "to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular 
kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States measured 
thereby," insofar as made with respect to obligations "payable in money of the United 
States," to be contrary to our public policy; and making such obligations dischargeable 
"upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of pay-
ment is legal tender for public and private debts." Its constitutionality was upheld 
in the cases cited in notes 200 and 204 infra. With respect to the nominalistic principle, 
see Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457, 548, 549 (1871). 
198 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 at 252, 253, 59 S.Ct. 847 (1939), 
pointing out that the prohibition contains "a catchall second sentence sweeping in 'every 
obligation' existing or future, 'payable in money of the United States,' irrespective of 
'whether or not any such provision is contained therein or made with respect thereto.'" 
199 English Transcontinental, Ltd. v. Puebla Tramway, Light &: Power Co., 186 
Misc. 481, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 356 (1946); In re Wirth's Estate, 132 N.Y.S. (2d) 98 (1954). 
200 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, note 198 supra; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Zurich 
General Accident &: Liability Ins. Co., 307 U.S. 265, 59 S.Ct. 856 (1939). 
201 With respect to the so-called "local payment rule" see Part III-G (1) and note 
153 supra. 
202 See cases cited in note 199 supra. Strangely enough the procedural conversion of 
the Swiss francs into dollars in the Puebla Tramway case was effected as of breach 
day. 
203 The distinction between "dollar-measure" (mensura) and "dollar-mensuratum" 
is of great importance. It explains why, under our law, the depreciation of the dollar 
must be disregarded, with respect to obligations for payment of a liquidated sum of 
domestic money, while the decline of its purchasing power may affect the quantum of 
unliquidated damages where the "mensuratum" does not consist of our national cur-
rency. On this subject in general see also NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, at 180, 181; MANN, 
note 8 supra, at 95-100; Eder, "Legal Theories of Money," 20 CoRN. L. Q. 52 at 65, 66 
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presumption of the value of the dollar. It is deemed to have 
remained stable as a matter of law, rather than fact.204 Under this 
conclusive presumption there is no room for any damages for its 
depreciation. 
On the other hand, in the absence of statute or treaty,205 the 
value of foreign money may, under our law, raise a question of 
fact.206 Moreover, it may fluctuate with time and place. The 
default or delay in performance may cause a loss. Such loss may 
be recoverable. As it is the value of the foreign money which is 
being measured (mensuratum) in our or in another currency 
(mensura) there is nothing in our law that would make the re-
covery of damages objectionable. 
It is only the value of the dollar which our law does not per-
mit to be measured by any other standard than that conclusively 
set forth by the statute. It follows that, with respect to obligations 
expressed in the money of the United States, damages for its 
depreciation are contrary to our public policy.207 No matter what 
the provisions of the controlling foreign law may be, it appears 
that no such damages may be awarded by an American court.208 
(1934); Dawson and Cooper, "The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts: United States 
1861-1879,'' 33 MICH. L. REV. 852 at 886-888 (1935); Simpkins v. Low, 54 N.Y. 179 (1873). 
204 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 at 304, 305, 55 S.Ct. 407 (1935); 
Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 at 329, 330, 55 S.Ct. 428 (1935); Perry v. United States, 
294 U.S. 330 at 356-358, 55 S.Ct. 432 (1935); Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 457, 
549 (1871). 
205 With respect to valuation for customs purposes see Tariff Act of June 1930, 46 
Stat. L. 739, §522, 31 U.S.C. (1952) §372; Barr v. United States (Cust. & Pat. App. 1947) 
161 F. (2d) 362 (1947). See, however, Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 65 S.Ct. 522 (1945); 
NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, at 337-339. On "par values of currencies" under the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, TREATIES AIID OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
Acr SERIES No. 1501, U.S. Dept. of State (1946) art. IV and esp. its §4 (a) and (b); Gold, 
"The Fund Agreement in the Courts, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 
315-324 (1951), and id., 482 (1952). Note, however, that the second sentence of art. IV, 
§4(b) provides that member countries "whose monetary authorities, for the settlement 
of international transactions, in fact freely buy and sell gold within the limits prescribed 
by the Fund" are deemed to be fulfilling the obligations stated therein. This appears 
to constitute an exemption in favor of this country. 
206 Freund v. Laenderbank Wien, N.Y. L.J. June 29, 1949, p. 2289 (Sup.Ct., N.Y. 
City, Valente, J.) affd. 277 App. Div. 770, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 549 (1950); Hughes Tool Co. v. 
United Artists Corp., 279 App. Div. 417, 110 N.Y.S. (2d) 383 (1952), affd. without op. 304 
N.Y. 942, 110 N.E. (2d) 884 (1953); Landau v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 12 (1946); Estate 
of Fokker v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1225 (1948); Strauss v. United States Lines Co., 180 
Misc. 664, 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 618 (1943). See also Marrache v. Ashton, [1943] A.C. 311; 
and Gold, note 205 supra. 
207 See notes 197 and 198 supra, and note 208 infra. 
208 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Zurich Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 307 U.S. 265, 59 
S.Ct. 856 (1939). An interesting illustration of this problem may be found in De Sayve 
v. De La Valdene, 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 143 (1953), affd. without op. 283 App. Div. 918, 
130 N.Y.S. (2d) 865 (1954), motion to appeal granted and appeal dismissed, 307 N.Y. 
861, 122 N.E. (2d) 747 (1954), motion to appeal and/or rehearing granted, 122 N.E. (2d) 
336 (1954), and discussed in notes 1, 49 and 258. Under the controlling French law 
(namely the cours force doctrine mentioned in the last paragraph of this note) an 
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The foregoing shows that under our law there are two rules 
on damages for depreciation of money. One, which may be refer-
red to as the "domestic money rule," applies to our own national 
currency, with respect to which such damages are not permissible. 
Another, the "foreign money rule" is applicable to foreign money, 
irrespective of whether it is the national currency of the foreign 
place of payment, with respect to which such damages may be 
permissible. 209 
2. There remains to be considered whether the lack of such 
a remedy may be deemed contrary to our public policy. No 
damages for depreciation of our own national currency being 
permissible, under our law it would be difficult to condemn com-
parable provisions of the foreign law, as long as the conditions in 
the foreign country are similar to ours. 
The more liberal rules of damages for depreciation of other 
obligation expressed in dollars and pounds payable in France under a French contract, 
was to be converted into francs as of a certain date. As~the result of a subsequent 
depreciation of the franc the procedural reconversion of t,.the amount of francs into 
dollars as of judgment date would have given plaintiff far4iess than "dollar for dollar" 
of the original obligation. Assuming that there was some fallacy in the theory leading 
to such a result the court decided that the franc obligation was to be converted into 
dollars at the breach-day rate of exchange. However, the question whether a con-
version of the original dollar obligation into francs constituted freezing of the value of 
the dollar in terms of francs as of the date fixed by French law, and whether this was 
contrary to our public policy and therefore unenforceable in our courts (see n. 200 
supra), was neither raised nor decided. Under the paramount law of the forum this 
part of the obligation may have remained one for the original amount of dollars that 
had been owed, with such interest and costs as may have become due. There may have 
been no need for any conversion. But, all this does not apply to another part of plaintiff's 
claim based on a debt of a sum of pounds sterling. The compulsory conversion of the 
English money into francs under the controlling French law, is certainly not objection-
able. The amount of francs obtained thereby sho~ld have been converted into dollars 
at the judgment-day rate of exchange (procedural conversion). · 
Although court decisions are lacking there may be instances calling for a restrictive 
interpretation of the cases cited in note 200 supra. Some of the recent international 
agreements to which this country is a party contain provisions indicating some relaxation 
of the strictness of our public policy with respect to the nominalistic principle and 
valorization clauses. See, e.g., the Universal Postal Convention of 1952 discussed in 
note 80 supra; and the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, 'TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL Acrs SEIUES, No. 1502, U.S. 
Dept. of State (1946), art. II, §9 (a), and art. IV, §4 (b) (i), containing re-valuation pro-
visions applicable in the event of a devaluation, or under a certain condition, a 
depreciation of the currencies involved. Moreover, in certain instances a strict interpre-
tation of the above decisions may nullify even such customary clauses fixing the rate of 
exchange as are mentioned in Part m-G (I) supra, or in United Shellac Corp. v. Jordan, 
277 App. Div. 147, 97 N.Y.S. (2d) 817 (1950). In this connection the French exception 
to the cours force doctrine based on the distinction between "domestic" and "inter-
national contracts" appears to be of interest. On this exception see decision of Cour 
de Cassation, Chambre Civ. of June 21, 1950, reported in 77 J. DU DROIT INT. (Clunet) 
1196 (1950); Lerebours-Pigeonniere, "A propos du Contrat International," 78 J. DU 
DROIT INT. (Clunet) pp. 4-29 (1951); and the authorities cited therein. 
209 On some difficulties caused by the failure to distinguish properly between these 
two rules of our law see D infra. 
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currencies are being gradually developed. It could hardly be 
said that the lack of comparable provisions of a foreign law would 
be shocking to our concept of justice. This was clearly recognized 
in the numerous judgment-day cases.210 
Whatever doubts there are appear to be based on a substantially 
different situation, namely that of a complete collapse of a national 
currency system.211 Such a breakdown of the national currency 
was experienced in Russia in the early years after the Bolshevik. 
revolution212 and in Germany in the first half of the twenties,213 
and in certain other countries.214 
The new currency unit introduced in Germany in 1924 was 
the equivalent of one trillion units of the preceding collapsed cur-
rency in which previous obligations had been expressed.215 This 
would have practically wiped out almost all obligations. The 
relief known as "revalorization" made available under the German 
law consisted in a new determination of the primary obligation 
on more or less equitable bases, irrespective of any default in 
payment.216 
As it was the debt and not the currency217 which was revalorized 
under the German law of obligations, similar relief was refused 
by an English court where the obligation was controlled by English 
law.218 The English decision was based on the view that "reval-
orization" was unknown to English law.219 It was this conclusion 
that was questioned by Professor Corbin.220 
210 See Deutsche Bank Filiale Numberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517, 47 S.Ct. 166 
(1926) and other judgment-day cases cited in note 58 supra. These cases rest on the 
assumption that the foreign law does not permit such relief. 
211 See MANN, note 8 supra, at 47, 48, 84, 85; and note 220 infra. 
212 See Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934); 
Tillman v. Nat. City Bank of New York, (2d Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 631; Rashba, "Debts 
in Collapsed Foreign Currencies," 54 Yale L. J. I at 12 (1944); and last part of note 48 
supra. 
213 NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, at 199 ff.; cases cited in note 42 supra. 
214 MANN, note 8 supra, at 80-82. 
215 NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, at 201. 
216 Id. at 206-215. The judicial revalorization was based on §242 of the German Civil 
Code providing in substance that the debtor must perform his obligation in accordance 
with good faith (Treu and Glauben). 
217 See note 218 infra. 
218 Anderson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 134 L.T.R. 
(n.s.) 577 at 562 (1926) per Bankes, L.J., p. 565, per Warrington, L.J. 
210 Ibid. 
220 5 CORBIN, note 185 supra, §1005, p. 55. As far as American substantive law is 
concerned his view on revaluation of obligations under such extraordinary circumstances, 
as a complete collapse of the currency system, may be justified. See Drake, "The Proper 
Rule in Fluctuating Exchanges," 28 MICH. L. REv. 229 (1930), relying on the interesting 
case of Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 557 (1869); but see evaluation of this decision 
in NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, at 188, 189. See also the interesting case in Matter of Lendle, 
250 N.Y. 502, 166 N.E. 182 (1929). There may be exceptional instances where the lack of 
such redress may be contrary to our public policy. See Rashba's example in 54 YALE 
L.J. I at 12 (1944) (prohibition of enforcement of debts by Soviet law; consequently 
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Whatever may be said with respect to whether under our or 
the English law a relief comparable to the German "revaloriza-
tion" is available in the event of a complete collapse of a currency, 
it raises a different problem from that analyzed in this paper.221 
In problems resulting from the collapse of a currency system we 
are faced with the determination of the quantum of the primary 
obligation, irrespective of any breach. Even if payment of the 
numerical amount of the debt had been made at maturity the 
obligation may not have been validly discharged.222 
On the other hand, with respect to the problem analyzed in 
this paper, none of the modem decisions of our courts goes beyond 
the value of the obligation at its maturity.223 They assume that 
the obligation would have been fully discharged by payment of 
its numerical (nominal) amount had timely payment been made, 
no matter how much the money may have depreciated in the 
meantime. Where there was a breach (delay of payment) or a 
wrong, the problem is whether a new secondary obligation came 
into existence by operation of law.224 
The preceding considerations show that the absence of a 
relief comparable to ours, with respect to damages for depreciation 
of foreign currencies after default, is usually not contrary to our 
public policy. Consequently none should be awarded, where 
this is the case. 
C. American and English Conflict of Laws Treatment 
of Procedural Conversions 
Where, occasionally, it was held225 that "the conversion date 
of the foreign money is to be determined by the law of the forum" 
this referred to a mere procedural conversion into dollars in 
which. the judgment of an American court was to be expressed.226 
no room for provisions that would remedy the hardship resulting from the collapse of 
the currency). However, any generalization that would permit our courts to disregard 
the foreign law just because of its adherence to the nominalistic principle appears to be 
untenable. Any exception would require a careful scrutiny. Our own law is based 
on the nominalistic principle and on the constitutional power of the government over 
currency. Its exercise may affect the value of private contracts. Julliard v. Greenman, 
110 U.S. 421, 4 S.Ct. 122 (1884); Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302 at 310, 311, 
31 S.Ct. 21 (1910); and the cases cited in notes 200 and 204 supra. 
221 NUSSBAUM, note 22 supra, at 218. 
222 Id. at 207. 
223 See Part II-B, C and D supra. 
224 See Part III-C, D and E supra. 
225 Shaw, Savill, Albion &: Co. v. The Fredericksburg, (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 952 
at 956, citing CONFLICTS R.EsrATEMENT §424, comment. 
226 See Part m-F supra. With respect to maritime law see note in 52 CoL. L. REv. 
141 (1952). 
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It is only to this extent, that the controlling foreign law, by which 
the quantum of the obligation is measured, does not come into 
play in our courts.227 This shows the importance of the distinction 
between substantive and procedural conversions under our con-
flicts doctrine. 
In England the situation is different. It will be recalled that 
the English breach-day rule is not intended to be compensatory.228 
Contrary to the American law no damages for depreciation of 
foreign money appear to be recoverable. Consequently, under 
the English doctrine there is no need for any substantive conver-
sion into another money in which the loss is to be measured 
(money of damages). No new and different secondary obligation 
comes into existence by operation of law; or, if it does, its nature 
and quantum are identical with the primary obligation.229 
This explains why, even after an action had been instituted in 
England, a debt of a sum of francs was held to have been discharged 
by payment of the original (nominal) amount in francs which had 
greatly depreciated after the default.230 The fact that on the 
belated payment day the debtor may have purchased the original 
(numerical) amount of francs for a far lesser sum of English money 
than on breach day was therefore irrelevant. Quite obviously 
this result is contrary to that which would have been obtained by 
the operation of the breach-day rule. 
Yet, in another case, based on almost identical facts, and con-
trolled by the same French law, where the debtor failed to take 
advantage of his opportunity of discharging the obligation in 
depreciated francs, the judgment award in sterling was computed 
at the pre-depreciation maturity (breach) -day rate of exchange.231 
The inconsistency of these two groups of cases, both of which 
appear to be equally authoritative, cannot be reconciled in any 
way other than by concluding that the English breach-day rule 
is (usually) a provision of the English procedural law.232 Need-
221 This follows from the well-established principle that matters of procedure are 
governed by the law of the forum. See 3 BEALE, note 22 supra, §584.1; GOODRICH, THE 
CONFLICT OF LAws §81, p. 151 (1927); id., 2d ed., §77, p. 187 (1938); STUMBERG, CONFLICT 
OF LAws, 2d ed., 134 (1951); CooK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAws, c. 
VI, pp. 156, 165, 166 (1942); NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 
(1943). In this connection see also note 147 supra. 
228 Part II-D and note 69 supra. 
229 Note 230 infra, Part III-H and note 175 supra. 
230 Societe des Hotels Le Touquet Paris-Plage v. Cummings, [1922] I K.B. 451 at 
460, 463. The same conclusion was expressed in a dictum in Grauman v. Treitel, [1940] 
2 All E. R. 188 at 200. 
231 Vionnet v. Wills, [1939] 4 All E.R. 136; [1940] I K.B. 72 at 73. To the same 
effect see cases and writings cited in notes 69 and 73 supra. 
232 DICEY, note 64 supra, at 749; CHITI'Y, CONTRACTS 435 (1947); "'\VOLFF, PRIVATE 
INTERNATIO~AL I.Aw, 2d ed., 242, 244 (1950); MANN, note 8 supra, at 316, 325. In fact, as 
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less to add that, being purely procedural and not intended to 
compensate the injured party, there is no logical justificatitm of 
the bi:each-day, rather than a judgment-day valuation in the 
money of the forum.233 This procedural character of the English 
conversion-valuation rule, together with a certain other peculi-
arity234 of the English law, resulted in an interesting conflict of 
laws doctrine. 
Contrary to the general principles adopted by the English 
courts with respect to other monetary problems, such as those 
arising under the American gold clause prohibition235 or the 
German revalorization,236 no effect is given to the foreign conver-
sion (valuation) rul€s, whatever the controlling law may be. The 
valuation date is determined by the English lex fori.231 
In fact, if the foreign valuation rules were also procedural, 
as may have been assumed by the English court, they could have 
been properly disregarded.238 But, we have no;ted that in the 
United States, for example, there are two different types of con-
versions (valuations). One substantive,239 another procedural.240 
In numerous foreign countries judgments may be expressed in 
the original foreign money actually owed.241 Consequently, 
damages were held not to be recoverable, the conversion into pounds sterling was usually 
clearly procedural. See cases cited in notes 64 and 73, supra. But see Khoury v. 
Khayatt, [1943] A.C. 507 at 514, 515, in which the conversion of Turkish pounds, owing 
under a promissory note made in Palestine, into Palestine currency, was dearly sub-
stantive. It was based on a provision of Palestine law, corresponding with §72, subs. 4 of 
the English Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 &: 46 Viet., c. 61), requiring that an amount 
of foreign money be translated into United Kingdom currency according to the rate of 
exchange for sight drafts at the place of payment on the day the bill is payable. This 
enactment fixes both the money of payment and the date of conversion, irrespective of 
whether litigation will ensue. See MANN, note 8 supra, at 282. Interestingly enough, 
owing to the depreciation of the Palestine pound in terms of Turkish pounds after 
maturity of the obligation, the breach-day conversion worked to the benefit of the 
defaulting party. 
233 Criticizing the English law for its failure to adopt principles comparable to ours, 
Professor Drake in 28 MICH. L. Rev. 229 at 236 (1930), points out that the English rule 
was reached "simply by following the precedents rather than by appealing to any 
rational principle of law or justice." 
234 See note 237. With respect to the doctrine of Philips v. Eyre, L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 at 
28 (1870), and Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q.B. 231. 
235 The King v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders, [1937] A.C. 
500 (quantum of a dollar obligation controlled by American law determined in accordance 
with the American Gold Clause prohibition). See also DICEY, note 64 supra, Rule 162. 
236 Komatzki v. Oppenheimer, [1937] 4 All E.R. 133; Re Schnaper, [1936] 1 All 
E.R. 322. In these cases controlled by German law the obligation expressed in marks 
was revalued by English courts in accordance with the rules of the German law. 
231 CliF.sHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3d ed., 857, 858 (1947); 4th ed., 662 (1952): 
DICEY, note 64 supra, Rule 165 (2), and id., comment on p. 749. 
238 Note 227. 
239 Part III-D and E; part IV-A. 
240 Part III-F; part IV-C. 
241 Note 8 supra. 
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there may be no need for any procedural conversion into the 
money of the forum. Or, irrespective of whether judgments may 
or may not be rendered in the original foreign currency, the 
governing (foreign) law may provide whether damages for de-
preciation of foreign, or even domestic, money are recoverable and 
to what extent.242 Such rules are clearly substantive. 
It was recognized that "if the proper law determines what 
constitutes a breach, it is also entitled to determine the con-
sequences of the breach,"243 and that "there can be no doubt, at 
least on principle, that remoteness of liability must be governed 
by the proper law of the obligation that rests upon the defend-
ant. "244 
There is no justification for a different approach with respect 
to damages for depreciation of foreign money, particularly where 
valuation agreements, such as gold dauses, increasing or reducing 
the quantum of the obligation in the event of fluctuation of the 
value of money, were held not to be contrary to English public 
policy.245 
To some extent this regrettable position of the English con-
flict of laws may be due to what was referred to as the "peculiar 
English doctrine" that for a tort to be actionable in England it 
must be both unjustifiable by the lex loci delicti and actionable 
by the lex fori.246 Whatever may be said with respect to torts, it 
does not explain the English theory with respect to contracts. 
242 Part 111-D and E; Transamerica General Corp. v. Zunino, 82 N.Y.S. (2d) 595 at 
604, 605 (1948), dealing with the question of damages for depreciation of money under 
art. 1224 of the Italian Civil Code of 1942; decisions of the Highest Court of Czechoslovakia 
of Oct. 25, 1935, Rv. II 781/33, Official Reports (Vazny) 14649 (permitting damages for a 
loss from devaluation of pounds sterling payable in London to a Czechoslovak creditor); 
of Feb. 27, 1937, Rv. I 266/35, Official Reports (Vazny) 15865 (permitting damages for 
a loss from devaluation of Czechoslovak money payable by a Czechoslovak firm to a 
German plaintiff in Germany; and of Feb. 2, 1928, Rv. I 849/27, Official Reports (Vazny) 
7763 (permitting damages resulting from the decline of the rate of exchange of German 
marks owing by a Czechoslovak debtor to a German creditor; and in general sources 
mentioned in note 93, supra; 2 SCHNITZER, HANDBUCH DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS, 
3d ed., 666, 667 (1950); MANN, note 8 supra, at 251, 252; Dach's comparative outline in 3 
AM. J. CoMP. I.Aw 156, 161 ff. (1954); and last part of note 208 supra. 
243 CHESHIRE, note 185 supra, at 853 (see also 4th ed., 1952, p. 660). 
244 Ibid.; J. D'Almeida Araujo v. Sir Frederick Becker & Co., [1953] 2 All E.R. 288 at 
290, 291 (with respect to contracts). 
245 Feist v. Societe Intercommunale Beige d'Electricite, [1934] A.C. 161; New Bruns-
wick Railway Co. v. British and French Trust Corp., [1939] A.C. 1. See also part of 
opinion of Lord Summer in Celia v. Voltumo, [1921] 2 A.C. 544 at 558, cited in 
note 69 supra. It is difficult to understand why indemnity for the depreciation of 
foreign money after a default of payment should be refused by an English court, where 
permissible under the proper law, if such compensation is enforceable, where based upon 
the terms of a contract. Quite logically the parties may have found it superfluous to 
repeat the indemnity provisions of the controlling law in the contract. 
246 CHESHIRE, note 185 supra, at 856; 4th ed., 1952, p. 662; DICEY, note 64 supra, 
Rule 174, pp. 800 and 806. To some extent Professor Cheshire's view, favoring the lex 
358 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
The difficulty of the rationale of the English valuation ( con-
version) rule rests simply in the fact that it is purely mechanical. 
As the English law now seems to stand, and however regrettable 
this may be, the conversion date of the foreign money into pounds 
sterling is determined by the English lex fori. With very few 
exceptions247 these conversions are effected as of breach or ma-
turity-day, whatever the cause of action may be. 
Thus the American and English conflict of laws doctrines 
on this subject appear to be substantially different. 
D. Confusion Resulting from Presumption of Similarity 
of Foreign and Domestic Law 
The preceding part of the discussion of the problem shows that 
both the provisions of our substantive law and the rules of our 
conflicts law are settled. The difficulties that may be encountered 
in cases based on foreign causes of action seem to arise under what 
may be referred to as an "emergency rule" of our law. In the 
fori, and failing to distinguish between substantive and procedural conver.;ions, is based 
on a passage in the judgment of Lord Wrenbury in Celia v. Volturno, [1921] A.C. 544 
at 563, 564, a case in which no conflict of laws problem was involved. A collision of 
two ships occurred on the high seas. The case was therefore governed by English law 
in its entirety [DICEY, note 64 supra, at 806; CHESHIRE, 4th ed., note 185 supra, at 273-
275; HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CoNFLICT OF LAws 276, 278-279 (1942)]. Moreover, the 
action was in tort. Even if these views were justifiable in torts there does not appear to 
be any valid reason for their extension to contracts. Such an extension is contrary to 
Professor Cheshire's views cited in notes 243 and 246, particularly where, both in the 
Volturno and in the Di Ferdinando cases, "remoteness" was one of the grounds for the 
court's conclusion that damages for depreciation of foreign money were not permissible. 
See also the critical evaluation of the doctrine of Philips v. Eyre, L.R. 6 Q. B. I at 28 
(1870); and of Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q.B. 231, in CHESHIRE, note 185 supra, 
4th ed., c. X (1952). 
247 With respect to claims based on foreign judgments the creditor was held to have 
an option to have the foreign currency valued either at the rate of exchange prevailing 
on the date of the foreign judgment, under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforce-
ment) Act, 1933, 23 GEo. V, c. 13, §2 (3), or at the original breach date rate of exchange. 
East India Tradin-g Co. v. Carmel Exporters and Importer.;, [1952] I All E.R. 1053 at 
1055, 1056, per Sellers, J. The learned judge cites Dicey's Rule 86, p. 410, that "A 
valid foreign judgment does not of itself extinguish the original cause of action in 
respect of which the judgment was given." Some English writers refer to the provision 
of § 2 (3) of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, supra, as an 
exception to the general breach-day rule. Another statutory exception in favor of the 
judgment-day rate of exchange is set forth in the Carriage by Air Act, 1932, 22 &: 23 Geo. 
V, c. 36, §1 (5). On these exceptions see DICEY, note 64 supra, at 749; MANN, note 8 supra, 
at 318; CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL I.Aw, 3d ed., 858 (1947); (4th ed. 1952) p. 
664; SCHMITTHOFF, ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAWS 365 (1945). It is doubtful whether the 
decisions in In re Chesterman's Trusts, [1923] 2 Ch. 466 [distribution of the assets of a trust 
fund situated in England in which the value of a debt expressed in foreign money was 
computed at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of the court's decision (certi-
ficate)], and in Kornatzki v. Oppenheimer, [1937] 4 All E.R. 133 [a sum of German marks 
revalorized under German law converted into English money at the judgment-day rate 
of exchange] constitute valid exceptions. With respect to foreign money purchased as 
a commodity see note 69 supra. See also that part of note 80, supra, dealing with the 
Universal Postal Convention of 1952. 
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absence of proof of the controlling law it may be assumed that 
with respect to fundamental obligations the foreign law is the 
same as our own law.248 The question is, however, which of the 
two different rules of our law is applicable.249 
If the imaginary "assimilated foreign law" is to be patterned 
according to our "domestic money rule," no damages would be 
recoverable.250 Under this theory our rule on dollar obligations 
would be extended to obligations actually expressed in such 
foreign money as is current at the foreign place of payment. This 
appears to have been done in Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. 
Humphrey.251 
If, on the other hand, the assumed "assimilated foreign law" 
were patterned according to our "foreign money rule" damages 
for depreciation of the national currency of the foreign place of 
payment might be recoverable. Our law permits damages for 
depreciation of the currency of the foreign place of payment, pro-
vided this was within the contemplation of the parties.252 Such 
an interpretation may have motivated the decision in Orlik v. 
Wiener Bank Verein.253 In this case a breach-day conversion 
resulted in an award of damages for depreciation of Austrian 
money, payable to an American creditor in Vienna. 
Under this interpretation any possible criticism of the deci-
sion254 would be limited to doubts as to whether such damages 
248 5 WILLISTON, note 74 supra, at 3928; 3 BEALE, note 22 supra, §622A.l; GOODRICH, 
THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 83, pp. 164, 165 (1927); SCHMITI'HOFF, THE ENGLISH CONFLICT OF 
LAws 369 (1945). According to some authorities [see BEALE, supra; and the authorities 
cited in Ehag Eisenbahnwerte Holding A.G. v. Banca Nationala a Romaniei, 306 N.Y. 
242, 117 N.E. (2d) 346 at 349 (1954) ], this presumption applies only to the laws of 
jurisdictions which adopted the common law of England. The foregoing comparison of 
English and American law shows, however, that quite contrary rules on the problem now 
under discussion were developed in these two basically common law countries. Moreover, 
the subject matter is affected by legislative enactments. For these reasons a distinction 
based on whether the respective legal system is based on the common law of England 
does not appear to be useful in this connection. It appears, therefore, that the party 
claiming to be entitled to damages for depreciation of foreign money under the con-
trolling law should be required to plead the respective provisions of the same. See 
Industrial Export&: Import Corp. v. Hongkong &: Shanghai Banking Corp., 302 N.Y. 342 
at 350, 98 N.E. (2d) 466 (1951); and note 100 supra. 
249 '\Vith respect to the rules of our law, one on damages for depreciation of our 
own national currency (domestic money rule) and another on monies foreign to the 
forum (foreign money rule), see last part of Part IV-B (1) supra. 
250 Ibid. 
251272 U.S. 517 at 519, 47 S.Ct. 166 (1926). See Part II-C, and note 53 supra. The 
same theory was applied in Bonell v. Von Schultz, 197 Misc. 756, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 617 
(1950). 
252 Cases cited note 196 supra. 
253 204 App. Div. 432, 198 N.Y.S. 413 (1923). In this case, in which the facts were 
almost identical with the Deutsche Bank case, note 251 supra, the valuation of the 
Austrian currency was effected as of breach day. 
254 This decision was criticized by Dr. Mann, note 8 supra, at 314, 315. However, 
under this construction Dr. Mann's doubts of the correctness of the decision; and of the 
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were within the contemplation of the parties. However, this 
would raise a mere question of fact.255 
Whatever the merits of these two possible ways of determining 
the "assimilated" rule of the foreign law may be, the problem is 
of minor importance. It is only an emergency makeshift. The 
parties may and should plead the provisions of the controlling 
foreign law.256 Furthermore, the finding of a rule of the foreign 
law constitutes only a determination of a question of fact in our 
courts. It does not become a binding precedent to which the 
doctrine of stare decisis would apply. If in a subsequent case it 
is proved that the foreign law is different, the court will decide 
accordingly.257 
E. Federal and State Rules 
There does not appear to be any discrepancy between the 
federal and New York law on this subject.258 A discussion of the 
Erie doctrine259 therefore becomes unnecessary. However, with 
respect to the question of jurisdiction of federal courts it may 
become important to decide whether, in what i~stances, and to 
what extent, the problem raises a federal question.260 
CONCLUSION 
These principles of the New York law may be very roughly 
summarized as follows: 
I. The necessity of a conversion-valuation of foreign money 
may arise from two substantially different causes: (a) either from 
views of Mr. Fraenkel in 35 CoL. L. REv. 360 (1935) in support of that outcome appear 
far less substantiated. 
255 Part ill-C supra. 
256 See last part of note 248 supra. 
257 Ottoman Bank of Nicosia v. Chakarian (2d case), (1938] A.C. 260 at 279, per 
Lord Wright; Krajina v. Tass Agency, [1949] 2 All E.R. 274 at 282, 283, per Tucker, L.J. 
258 See Part III-A and C, and notes 77 and 109 supra; and Part IV-D. However, this 
does not justify the oversimplified view expressed in De Sayve v. De La Valdene, 124 
N.Y.S. (2d) 143 at 155 (1953), that the oonversion principles expressed in Hicks v. 
Guinness and in the Humphrey case, supra, were matters as to which the state courts 
are not bound to follow federal decisions. In view of the reoognized control of the 
federal government over matters of currency, there may be, and certainly are, instances 
involving federal questions. See critique· of the De Sayve case in notes 49, 208 supra and 
note 260 infra. 
259 ;Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 at 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938), holding that 
"There is no federal general common law • • • applicable in a State. • • ." On this sub-
ject see also NussBAUM, note 22 supra, at 373; and Shaw, Savill, Albion&: Co. v. The Fred-
ericksburg, (2d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 952 at 956. 
260 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1331; BARRON AND HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 
§25, pp. 50-53 (1950); I-A OHLINGER'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, rev. ed., 64-66 (1950). It should 
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the requirement of the applicable substantive law (substantive 
conversions);261 or (b) by reason of the procedural rule of the 
forum requiring judgments to be expressed in domestic money 
(procedural conversions);262 or (c) from both.263 
2. Where in accordance with the rules of conflict of laws the 
problem is controlled by New York law, the date as of which the 
valuation is to be effected depends on whether damages for 
depreciation of the foreign currency after default in terms 0f an-
other money are recoverable.264 
3. Under New York law such damages are recoverable with-
in the scope of the doctrine of c©mequential clamages (Hadley v. 
Baxendale).265 
4. Within these limits such damages are to be measured: (a) 
in the currency in which the loss was actually sustained (money 
of damages), although it may be different from the money in which 
the 0bligation was 0riginally expressed (money of account, €(;)Il-
tract), or from the money of the forum;266 (b) as 0f such. time as 
would place the inno€ent party in the same position as if there 
haa been no breach 0r wrong.267 This will usually be 
(i) where the foreign money depreciates after default 
in terms of the mcmey of damages-as of the time of breach;268 
(ii) where the foreign currency acquired in the respec-
tive transaction as a mere commodity (as distinguished from 
money) appreciates after maturity-as of the time plaintiff 
learned of, and was in a position to replace the loss. Mitiga-
tion of damages ("cover") may be required;269 
(iii) where the foreign currency functioning in the 
underlying transaction as money (medium of exchange) 
appreciates after maturity-as of a subsequent time depending 
be noted that in tbis country the requirement that all proceedings in the courts of the 
United States shall be kept in dollars and cents is a part of a federal statute. See note 8 
supra; and Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 229 at 254, 19 S.Ct. 141 (1868); also 
last part of note 220, and Part IV-C supra, on the constitutional power of the govern-
ment over currency. However, the problem may be a fairly complicated one. 
261 Part ID-D (3) and E. 
262 Part ID-F. 
263 Part ID-E (2) and F, and note 144. 
264 Part ID-B, C, D (3), E and G. 
265 Part ID-C. 
266 Part III-D (3) and E. 
267 Part ill-C, G and H. 
26s Part m-G (2) (a). 
269 Part ill-G (2) (b). 
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on the contemplation of the parties. Mitigation of damages 
("cover") is not required.270 Plaintiff has, however, an 
option to proceed on the theory of debt (rather than breach 
of contract), under which the valuation, if any, would be 
effected as of the time of the actual payment, or judgment 
(see points 6 and 8).271 
5. Where the valuation is required under the doctrine of re-
exchange, the valuation is to be effected as of the time of dis-
honor of the bill of exchange.272 However, plaintiff appears to 
have an option to proceed "in debt" on the theory of enforcing 
the primary obligation rather than the "re-exchange."273 
6. Where no damages are claimed or recoverable the valua-
tion is to be effected as of the time when the necessity thereof had 
first arisen, unless a different provision is contained in the con-
tract. Where no prior valuation was required this will be as of 
the time of actual payment.274 
7. A foreign money obligation is not transformed into a 
domestic money obligation by merely instituting an action in 
New York.275 
8. Judgments are to be expressed in dollars and cents.276 
Where the ultimate obligation (which, depending on the appli-
cable substantive law, may or may not include damages) is ex-
pressed in foreign money, its conversion into the money of the 
forum (procedural conversion) is to be made as of judgment 
(trial) -day.277 
9. In cases based on a foreign cause of action, damages for 
depreciation of foreign money are recoverable in accordance with 
the provisions of the controlling substantive law.278 
IO. Whatever the provisions of the applicable foreign law 
may be. no damages for depreciation of the money of the United 
States may be allowed by an American court.279 
210 Part ill-G (2)(c). 
271 Part III-G (2) (c), and H. 
212 Part ill-G (1). 
273 Part III-H. 
274 Part III-G (1). 
275 Part III-D (1) and (2), and F. 
276 Note 8 supra. 
277 Part III-F. 
278Part IV. 
279 Part IV-B (1). 
